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CREDIT-MONITORING DAMAGES IN CYBERSECURITY 
TORT LITIGATION 
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INTRODUCTION  
When someone improperly accesses or discloses an individual‟s per-
sonal information, the subject of that data breach is often at an increased 
risk of identity theft.1 One way for an affected data subject to guard against 
this risk is to subscribe to a credit-monitoring service. In this type of ar-
rangement, a business reviews information, generally on a daily basis, from 
one or more of the major credit-reporting agencies.2 When a change in the 
data subject‟s credit history occurs, such as the unauthorized opening of a 
new account in the victim‟s name, the service alerts the data subject.3 As a 
result, the victim of a data-security breach can take prompt action to minim-
ize the consequences of identity theft and can, perhaps, avoid financial 
ruin.4 Remedial steps may include closing an unauthorized account, placing 
a fraud alert in a credit-reporting agency‟s files, freezing distribution of 
credit reports, or obtaining a declaratory judgment that the data subject is 
the victim of identity theft, which may aid the data subject in dealing with 
law enforcement authorities.5  
  
 * Professor of Law, St. Mary‟s University School of Law. Yale University, LL.M.; University of 
Notre Dame, J.D.; St. Vincent College, B.A., LL.D. Professor Johnson‟s books include: STUDIES IN 
AMERICAN TORT LAW (4th ed. 2009) (with Alan Gunn); MASTERING TORTS: A STUDENT‟S GUIDE TO 
THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 2009); and ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH (2010).  
 1 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liabili-
ty, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (2005) (discussing the potential adverse consequences of database 
intrusion). The fact that data disclosure increases the risk of identity theft is so well established that 
some defendants do not contest the issue. See Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 
2010 WL 86391, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (noting that the defendants responsible for personal in-
formation being temporarily available on the Internet did “not seem to challenge whether Rowe and the 
purported class members were put at a „substantial risk‟ of identity theft or some other harm”). 
 2 See Credit Monitoring Services: A Comparison, AAACREDITGUIDE.COM, 
http://aaacreditguide.com/credit-monitoring-services/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 3 See id.  
 4 See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1008 (N.H. 2003) (“Victims of identity theft 
risk the destruction of their good credit histories. This often destroys a victim‟s ability to obtain credit 
from any source and may, in some cases, render the victim unemployable or even cause the victim to be 
incarcerated.”); see also Guillermo Contreras, Key Figure Admits Guilt in Huge ID Theft Case, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 6, 2011, at 2B (indicating that victims of identity theft found it hard to 
get loans and faced “lingering headaches in trying to straight[en] things out”). 
 5 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 259-61 (discussing remedial and preventive options); see also 
James Graves, Note, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-Medical Harms: Evaluating the Reasonable Ne-
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Credit-monitoring services will not detect the unauthorized use of ex-
isting accounts or types of data misuse unrelated to credit,6 such as fraudu-
lent presentation of credentials to obtain employment or medical care.7 
However, credit monitoring is particularly useful in detecting the opening 
of new accounts in the victim‟s name, which is an especially potent form of 
identity theft.8 
Recently, potential cybersecurity defendants have provided credit-
monitoring services to affected data subjects voluntarily.9 In addition, 
courts have approved credit-monitoring compensation as part of class-
action settlements10 and sanctioned defendants by requiring them to provide 
credit monitoring or to reimburse the costs of such services.11 These devel-
opments demonstrate that credit-monitoring expenditures are both reasona-
ble and necessary when a serious breach of data security occurs.12  
As this Article shows, compensation for credit monitoring is both ana-
logous to court awards for medical monitoring13 and justified under ordi-
nary tort principles. Furthermore, the economic-loss rule14 should not bar 
recovery of credit-monitoring damages because the data-protection obliga-
tions imposed by state and federal data-security laws are not a proper sub-
ject for private bargaining. Indeed, courts have held that such agreements 
are against public policy.15 If a data possessor negligently and seriously 
breaches cybersecurity, an affected data subject should be able to recover 
the resulting costs of credit monitoring regardless of whether identity theft 
ever occurs. 
By requiring data possessors to cover credit-monitoring costs, courts 
will deter breaches of cybersecurity. Data possessors will have an incentive 
to implement reasonable precautions to guard against unauthorized data 
access and to avoid unnecessarily risky practices related to the handling and 
  
cessity of Measures to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶¶ 71-78, at 
50-56 (2009) (discussing credit freezes and fraud alerts); see also 112 AM. JUR. Trials § 19 (2009) 
(discussing specific steps a lawyer should take in representing a victim of credit monitoring); Tim Trai-
nor, Hard to Prevent Identify Theft, MONT. STANDARD, Dec. 19, 2010, at A2 (stating that, in Montana, 
persons can “fill out an identity theft passport that proves to creditors and law enforcement officers that 
someone has used a victim‟s identity to commit fraud”). 
 6 See Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 70, at 50 (discussing some of the problems with credit-monitoring 
services). 
 7 See id. ¶ 53, at 36 (distinguishing between “new account fraud, existing account fraud, and non-
financial fraud”). 
 8 Fighting Back Against Identity Theft, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 9 See infra Part II.B. 
 10 See infra Part II.C. 
 11 See infra Part II.D. 
 12 See infra Part II.E. 
 13 See infra Part III. 
 14 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 15 See infra Part I.C.2. 
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storing of digital personal information.16 Moreover, judicial recognition of 
this element of damages will tend to reduce the costs of cyber-related losses 
by shifting credit-monitoring costs to cheaper cost avoiders and spreading 
data-protection costs to the classes of people who benefit from commercial 
use of computerized personal information.17 Thus, treating credit-
monitoring damages as compensable is not only consistent with basic legal 
principles and established tort theories but also supported by several prin-
ciples of public policy that have played a major role in shaping contempo-
rary American tort law. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the importance of credit 
monitoring and of tort claims related to cybersecurity. It also discusses the 
duty to protect digital personal information and to disclose breaches of cy-
bersecurity, as well as the reasons why the economic loss rule should not 
bar claims for the costs of credit monitoring. Part II of this Article discusses 
the precedent dealing with credit-monitoring damages, related business 
practices, class-action settlements, and judicial and administrative sanc-
tions. Part III explores the issue of whether credit-monitoring damages are 
analogous to the medical-monitoring damages that many states award to 
victims of toxic exposure. Part IV then considers arguments against the 
compensability of credit-monitoring damages in cybersecurity lawsuits. 
These include the alleged lack of present injury in cases where the plaintiff 
has not experienced identity theft and the ability of potential plaintiffs to 
self-protect against economic harm by purchasing credit-monitoring servic-
es. Part V then explains why courts should allow victims of data-security 
breaches to recover compensation for the costs of credit monitoring. The 
Article argues that protection from identity theft should be as widespread as 
commercial use of computerized personal information and that businesses 
should be required to internalize the costs of their negligent data practices. 
In many instances, businesses are well-situated to efficiently spread identity 
theft prevention costs among those who benefit from the use of compute-
rized personal information. Finally, this Article concludes that plaintiffs 
should be able to recover credit-monitoring costs often in cybersecurity 
litigation. 
I. UNCERTAIN COMPENSABILITY 
Credit monitoring has become not only a common method of protect-
ing the security of personal information but also a common claim for dam-
ages in tort litigation. This Part discusses how credit monitoring is both 
affordable and effective. It provides an overview of the starting assump-
tions related to any discussion of whether credit-monitoring damages are 
  
 16 See infra Part V.A. 
 17 See infra Part V.B. 
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recoverable in cybersecurity cases. Those assumptions relate to the duty to 
protect data and disclose breaches of security and to the economic-loss rule. 
A. Issue of Widespread Importance 
Basic credit monitoring is not expensive,18 at least when it concerns 
only one individual.19 However, breaches of database security (sometimes 
called “cybersecurity”) occur frequently20 and often affect thousands,21 or 
even millions,22 of persons.23 This is especially true in cases of unauthorized 
  
 18 Comparison of Credit Monitoring Services, KNOWZY (June 22, 2011, 7:43 PM), 
http://www.knowzy.com/credit-monitoring-comparison.htm (showing that credit-monitoring costs can 
range from $8.95 to $29.95 per month). But see David Lazarus, Spend the $15 a Month on Debts, Not on 
an Online Debt Organizer, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, at B1 (“[I]f your problem is that you owe busi-
nesses too much money . . . you can probably live without daily credit monitoring . . . .”). 
 19 Experian‟s “Triple Alert” credit-monitoring service, which sells for $8.95 per month, bills itself 
as the “most affordable credit monitoring product on the market today.” TRIPLEALERT.COM, 
https://www.experiandirect.com/triplealert/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). Other more expen-
sive forms of credit monitoring, such as Experian‟s Triple Advantage product, bundle reports based on 
daily review of the three major credit-reporting agencies with other benefits. Triple Advantage “moni-
tors a person‟s credit files, sends email alerts of suspicious activity, and allows a person to check their 
credit reports.” In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 
2009 WL 5184352, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009). “The Experian Guarantee guarantees the „Triple 
Advantage‟ product up to $1 million for identity theft losses.” Id.; see also David Christianson, Moni-
toring Your Credit’s Health, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Jan. 7, 2011, at B4 (placing the cost of credit 
monitoring at $15 per month, including identity theft insurance); Daniel Wolfe, Regions Offers $5 Anti-
Fraud Services, AM. BANKER, Jan. 28, 2011, at 10 (stating that for five dollars per month, Regions 
Financial Corp. offers “credit monitoring, real-time transaction monitoring for up to 10 payment cards, 
and up to $2,500 in identity theft insurance. The card-monitoring service alerts consumers of potentially 
fraudulent activity within 24 hours of its occurrence”). Some lawsuits involve claims where plaintiffs 
seek to recover the costs of credit monitoring but also the cost of insurance against losses that may result 
from identity theft. See In re Killian, No. 05-14629-HB, 2009 WL 2927950, at *2 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 
23, 2009) (indicating that the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought $25.00 per month for credit-monitoring 
services where the cost included “insurance to cover the cost of any actual identity theft that may occur 
while the credit monitoring services are in place” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20 Two sites compile up-to-date lists of security breaches, Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY 
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach, and Data Breaches, 
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/
ITRC_2008_Breach_List.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) (including data from 2005-2011). 
 21 See Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1112 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing 
the theft from a car of computerized disks and tapes containing unencrypted records relating to 365,000 
patients); Samara Kalk Derby, UW Warns 60,000 of Card Data Theft, WIS. ST. J., Dec. 10, 2010, at A7 
(discussing the hacking of the identification card information of tens of thousands of former students, 
faculty, and staff members, which placed social security numbers at risk). 
 22 See John Markoff, Hackers Said to Breach Google Password System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 
2010, at A1 (discussing the breach of a password system that “controls access by millions of users 
worldwide to almost all of [Google‟s] Web services”). 
 23 See generally Jane E. Kirtley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security, in 2 COMMUNICATIONS 
LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 2010, at 15, 29-31 (2010) (discussing “a list of notable data breaches”); Jane 
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intrusions into the data held by credit card issuers,24 mortgage25 and student-
loan26 lenders, universities,27 banks,28 online marketers,29 and large employ-
ers.30 In such instances, credit-monitoring expenditures can cost millions of 
dollars.31 Thus, it is not surprising that some businesses and other defen-
dants charged with negligent failure to protect personal data or to reveal 
information concerning unauthorized access have disclaimed responsibility 
for the costs of credit monitoring.32 On the other hand, plaintiffs in cyberse-
curity cases often argue that defendants are responsible for such amounts 
and for other expenses as well.33 
Whether plaintiffs can recover the costs of credit monitoring in tort ac-
tions is important for a variety of reasons, including whether qualified 
counsel is willing to represent affected persons in class action litigation. It 
is usually difficult for at-risk data subjects to prove that defendants are re-
  
K. Winn, Recent Developments in the Emerging Law of Information Security, 38 UCC L.J. 391, 400-02 
(2006) (discussing numerous data security breaches). 
 24 See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 397 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(involving 45 million credit cardholders). 
 25 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009 
WL 5184352, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (discussing a data security breach that affected more than 
10 million persons). 
 26 See Student Loan Company: Data on 3.3M People Stolen, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/03/26/student-loan-company-data-m-people-stolen/ [hereinafter Data 
on 3.3M People Stolen] (indicating that the stolen data of more than 3 million borrowers, located on 
“portable media,” included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 27 See, e.g., Derby, supra note 21 (discussing the University of Wisconsin-Madison). 
 28 See Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (discussing the loss of computer back-up tapes allegedly 
containing information relating to 12.5 million individuals). 
 29 See Editorial, Who Really Sent That E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A24 (discussing the 
theft of names and e-mail addresses of customers of some of the nation‟s largest businesses, and the risk 
that those customers would be vulnerable to “sophisticated identity-theft ploys” such as “spear phish-
ing”). 
 30 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (involving the unen-
crypted data of 97,000 employees). 
 31 See, e.g., In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 
2010 WL 3341200, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010) (placing the cost of credit monitoring in a class 
action at “$37 per person,” or $7 million); see also Andreas Antonopoulos, Security Predictions for 
2011, NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 20, 2010, at 16 (“[J]ust buying credit monitoring and sending letters to 
the 500,000 people whose identities you lost can cost tens of millions of dollars and wipe out your 
business.”). 
 32 See Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App‟x 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 33 For example, in Saenz v. Kaiser Permanente International, the plaintiff alleged that “she and 
members of the class have suffered economic damages, including the costs of obtaining identity theft 
insurance, professional credit monitoring, cancelling and obtaining new credit and debit cards, as well as 
fees for freezing and unfreezing bank and credit accounts.” No. C 09-5562, 2010 WL 668038, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010). 
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sponsible for losses such as emotional distress34 or increased risks of future 
harm.35 And, until identity theft occurs, other types of damage resulting 
from data exposure may be modest in amount.36 Thus, credit-monitoring 
losses may form the lion‟s share of potentially recoverable damages in a 
dispute with an allegedly negligent database possessor.       
B. Tort Claims Related to Cybersecurity 
Credit-monitoring damages may be sought in non-cybersecurity cases, 
such as disputes arising when a creditor makes an erroneous report to cre-
dit-reporting agencies37 or when a credit-reporting agency sells a credit re-
port to a third person without a “permissible purpose.”38 Compensation for 
the costs of credit monitoring is also sometimes sought under non-tort theo-
ries of liability.39 Moreover, some judicial opinions use the phrase “credit 
  
 34 See Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1116-20 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (denying 
recovery of emotional distress damages in a case arising from the theft of unencrypted records relating 
to hundreds of thousands of patients from a car). But see Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., 
No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (allowing a claim for severe emotional 
distress damages to proceed). 
 35 See Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1021 (D. Minn. 2006). 
[Plaintiffs] overlook the fact that their expenditure of time and money was not the result of 
any present injury, but rather the anticipation of future injury that has not materialized. In 
other words, the plaintiffs‟ injuries are solely the result of perceived risk of future harm. 
Plaintiffs have shown no present injury or reasonably certain future injury to support damag-
es for any alleged increased risk of harm.  
Id. But see Rowe, 2010 WL 86391, at *6 (holding, in a case based on inadvertent posting of personal 
information on the Internet, that the plaintiff could “collect damages based on the increased risk of 
future harm he incurred, but only if he can show that he suffered from some present injury beyond the 
mere exposure of his information to the public”). 
 36 Cf. In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 400 (D. Mass. 2008) (ex-
plaining that a settlement allowed compensation for the cost of replacing driver‟s licenses, “out-of-
pocket expenses,” and “lost time”). 
 37 See, e.g., Wang v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (indi-
cating that, in a controversy based on the defendant‟s reporting of debts to credit-reporting agencies 
without also disclosing that such debts were disputed or that the applicable statutes of limitations barred 
the courts from enforcing the debts, the plaintiff sought compensation for “forced purchase of credit 
reports and credit monitoring,” as well as other expenses). 
 38 E.g., Daniels v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. CV 109-017, 2010 WL 331690, at *2 (S.D. 
Ga. Jan. 19, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (recounting that the plaintiff demanded “free 
credit monitoring for one year”). 
 39 See Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 & n.6 (W.D. Mich. 
2006) (denying recovery of creditor-monitoring damages based on breach of contract or violation of the 
Michigan Consumer Protection Act, and expressly noting that no claim for negligence had been asserted 
and that, therefore, an earlier case, which had allowed recovery of credit-monitoring damages, was 
“neither applicable nor persuasive”). 
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monitoring” in ways that have nothing to do with tracking the credit of in-
dividuals40 or that are unrelated to recovery of damages for such services.41 
This Article is concerned with the compensability of credit-monitoring 
costs only in tort cases involving cybersecurity issues. This range of con-
duct includes failing to protect data from unauthorized access; negligently42 
or intentionally43 disclosing or transferring personal information (such as 
via postings on the Internet, e-mail correspondence, or attachments to court 
filings44); and, neglecting to inform data subjects that the security of their 
personal data has been compromised. 
C. Starting Assumptions 
1. Duty to Protect and Disclose Breaches 
This Article assumes arguendo that a data processor has a duty to pro-
tect the personal information of others from unauthorized access or revela-
tion and to disclose information about a known breach of data security to 
the affected data subjects. These duties are rooted in common law prin-
ciples;45 in the terms of, or public policies reflected in, the security-breach 
notification laws and other provisions that numerous states have passed;46 
  
 40 See, e.g., Aerotel, Ltd. v. Telco Grp., Inc., No. 1:04-cv-10292-RJH-FM, 2010 WL 1916015, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (discussing, in a patent infringement suit, “credit monitoring” and pre-
payment features related to telephone systems). 
 41 See Scandaglia v. Transunion Interactive, Inc., No. 09 C 2121, 2010 WL 3526653, at *5-8 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2010) (containing an incidental reference to “credit monitoring” in a service mark 
infringement action); Fed. Trade Comm‟n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 n.20 
(M.D. Fla. 2010) (referring to “credit monitoring” in a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action). 
 42 See, e.g., Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *1-2 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (involving a variety of claims brought by insurance plan members whose person-
al information was temporarily accessible to the public on the Internet). 
 43 See generally 1-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Bournazian, No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962 
(Mass. Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (awarding credit-monitoring damages in an action alleging conversion, 
breach of contract, and breach of loyalty against a former employee who improperly took and then 
unlawfully deleted highly confidential personal information of sixty-eight employees). 
 44 See, e.g., In re Maple, 434 B.R. 363, 369, 376-77 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2010) (declining to dismiss, 
in a suit arising from a creditor‟s filing of a claim in bankruptcy litigation that improperly reveals per-
sonal information, certain state-law claims seeking compensation for emotional distress, credit monitor-
ing, and other damages). 
 45 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 272-82 (discussing common law principles evidencing a duty to 
protect data from unauthorized disclosure); id. at 288-96 (examining basic tort principles that create a 
duty to reveal knowledge that data security has been compromised). But see In re Davis, 430 B.R. 902, 
909 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff failed to properly allege actions for invasion of 
privacy or negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
 46 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, The Emergence of State Data Privacy and Security Laws Affecting 
Employers, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 483, 489-507 (2008) (discussing state laws that protect data 
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and in various other pieces of state47 and federal48 legislation that impose 
particular data-security obligations. Courts have enforced these duties in 
recent cases,49 although there is authority to the contrary.50 
  
and require notification of breach); see also Johnson, supra note 1, at 263-66, 270-72 (discussing the 
duty to protect computerized personal information under state security breach notification laws); id. at 
282-87 (examining notification duties imposed by state security breach notification laws). The National 
Conference of State Legislatures‟ list of state laws requiring notice of security breaches can be found at: 
State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT‟L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotific
ationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx (“Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands have enacted legislation requiring notification of security breaches involving personal 
information.”). The Conference‟s year-by-year list of security breach legislation is available at: Breach 
of Information, NAT‟L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=13481 (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 47 See Lazzarotti, supra note 46, at 490-92 (discussing state laws that protect social security num-
bers). But see Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Fin. Bank, 677 F. Supp. 2d 994, 996, 1000-09 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
(discussing and rejecting, in part, several statutory theories of liability); Paul v. Providence Health Sys.-
Or., 240 P.3d 1110, 1120-22 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim 
under the Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act in a case arising from the theft of unencrypted patient 
records). 
 48 See generally GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND 
DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
RL34120_20100128.pdf (discussing the various federal laws that now have provisions or regulations 
relating to security and data breaches); Lazzarotti, supra note 46, at 487 (stating that “[t]he federal 
government has yet to pass a broad-based data privacy and security statute” and instead has addressed 
“specific types of information, in some cases on an industry-by-industry basis”). But see Elizabeth D. 
De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 52 (2008) (arguing that federal enactments, 
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which purport to protect privacy, fail to achieve their promise). Some authors 
have argued the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which imposes data protection obligations on finan-
cial institutions, is a proper basis for a civil cause of action. See Anthony E. White, Comment, The 
Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for Victims of Identity Theft: Someone Stole My Identity, 
Now Who Is Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 865-66 (2005) (discussing a negligence per se 
theory of liability). However, at least two courts have rejected that argument. See Davis, 430 B.R. at 908 
(holding that Gramm-Leach-Bliley does not create a private right of action); In re Matthys, No. 09-
16585-AJM-13, 2010 WL 2176086, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 26, 2010); see also Johnson, supra 
note 1, at 268-69 (arguing that Gramm-Leach-Bliley lacks the specificity required to support a negli-
gence per se tort action by a data subject against a financial institution). Applicable provisions of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflect the importance of protecting personal information from impro-
per access. Rule 5.2 provides in relevant part: 
(a) Redacted Filings. Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with 
the court that contains an individual‟s social-security number, taxpayer-identification num-
ber, or birth date, the name of an individual known to be a minor, or a financial-account 
number, a party or nonparty making the filing may include only: 
(1) the last four digits of the social-security number and taxpayer-identification number;  
(2) the year of the individual‟s birth;  
(3) the minor‟s initials; and  
(4) the last four digits of the financial-account number.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a). Exceptions to the general rule on redacted filings are set forth in a different 
subsection. See id. 5.2(b). 
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In Shames-Yeakel v. Citizens Financial Bank,51 a federal court in Illi-
nois found that “[a] number of courts have recognized that fiduciary institu-
tions have a common law duty to protect their members‟ or customers‟ con-
fidential information against identity theft.”52 When an unknown person 
gained access to the bank customers‟ online accounts and stole thousands of 
dollars, the court held that the customers were victims of identity theft.53 
The court ruled that the customers had a valid negligence claim against the 
bank because it employed only a single-password form of account protec-
tion.54  
Numerous commentators agree that businesses have a duty to prevent 
improper access or revelation of personal information and to disclose know-
ledge of security breaches.55 Of course, absent proof of duty, a negligence 
  
 49 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 
5014386, at *2-4 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010) (ordering a party whose electronic case filing improperly 
disclosed personal information to notify affected individuals of the disclosure and provide twelve 
months of credit monitoring free of charge); see also Poli v. Mountain Valleys Health Ctrs., Inc., 
No. 2:05-2015-GEB-KJM, 2006 WL 83378, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2006) (finding that the plaintiff 
stated a claim for negligent disclosure of medical information); 1-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Bournazian, 
No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962, at *1-3 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (holding a former em-
ployee liable for credit monitoring and other damages in a case arising from the improper removal of 
confidential employee information); Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of Am. Fed‟n of State, Cnty., & Mun. 
Emps., No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *1, *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per curiam) (holding a 
union liable for identity theft damages resulting from the union‟s failure to safeguard members‟ personal 
information). Of course, liability may be imposed for failure to safeguard data in hard copy form. See 
Scott v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., No. A05-649, 2006 WL 997721, at *1, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 
2006) (affirming a judgment imposing liability under the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act for 
damages resulting from improper disposal of educational records). But see In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 3341200, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 
2010) (“[T]he current state of the law in regards to data breaches does not bode well for Plain-
tiffs. . . . [T]his factor weighs heavily in favor of settlement.”). 
 50 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting claims for 
negligence and breach of contract arising from the theft of a laptop containing unencrypted employee 
information); Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 CIV 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *4, *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (finding that no duty was owed to millions of persons 
whose personal information was contained on computer back-up tapes that were lost). 
 51 677 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 52 Id. at 1007-08.  
 53 Id. at 996-97. 
 54 Id. at 1008-09; see also Sue Reisinger, How Fast Is Fast Enough to Tell Customers About Data 
Breaches?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 25, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
1202504732096 (discussing a federal court decision holding Comerica Bank liable for data breach 
losses). 
 55 See, e.g., Derek A. Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect 
Collections of Personal Information?, 3 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 7, ¶ 4 (2006) (“Like legislatures, 
courts are signaling some willingness to impose a common law duty of care to protect personal informa-
tion.”); Bill Piatt & Paula DeWitte, Loose Lips Sink Attorney-Client Ships: Unintended Technological 
Disclosure of Confidential Communications, 39 ST. MARY‟S L.J. 781, 815 (2008) (“Attorneys have an 
ethical obligation . . . . to protect data stored electronically from unintended disclosure either through 
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claim will fail. In that case, unless there is some other theory of liability, the 
courts need not reach the question of what damages plaintiffs may recover 
in cybersecurity actions. 
2. Not Barred by the Economic Loss Rule 
This Article assumes arguendo that the so-called “economic loss rule” 
does not bar recovery of credit-monitoring losses. That rule—if it is a 
rule56—is a principle of uncertain dimensions, which holds that, at least in 
some circumstances, negligence that causes purely economic losses, with-
out also producing personal injury or property damage, is not actionable in 
tort law.57 The elegant simplicity of the “rule” masks a messier reality be-
cause the “rule” is subject to a multitude of well-recognized exceptions. As 
noted in a previous article:  
Not the least of these qualifications are the causes of action imposing liability for negligent 
misrepresentation, defamation, professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, nuisance, 
loss of consortium, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and unreasonable failure to settle 
a claim within insurance policy limits, all of which may afford recovery for negligence caus-
ing purely economic losses to the plaintiff.
58
 
In large measure, the economic loss rule is intended to further the pri-
vate ordering of business transactions.59 However, data-security statutes in 
  
inadvertent release of the information or from failure to secure the data against unauthorized 
access. . . . [and] must act reasonably to prevent, detect, and remedy security breaches.”); see also Lori 
J. Parker, Cause of Action for Identity Theft, in 31 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d, at 1, 23-25 (2006) (discussing 
theories of liability); Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 244-62 (2008) (discussing developments in Canada); Paul M. Schwartz & 
Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 923-25 (2007) (dis-
cussing tort liability). 
 56 Professor Oscar S. Gray, an eminent torts scholar, has expressed doubts about whether there is a 
single, unified economic loss rule. He wrote that: 
I had not previously thought that there was any such thing as a single “economic loss rule.” 
Instead, I had thought that there was a constellation of somewhat similar doctrines that tend 
to limit liability, in the case of purely economic loss, from what might have been expected 
under Palsgraf in the case of physical loss. These doctrines seemed to work in somewhat dif-
ferent ways in different contexts, for similar but not necessarily identical reasons, with ex-
ceptions where the reasons for limiting liability were absent. 
Oscar S. Gray, Some Thoughts on “The Economic Loss Rule” and Apportionment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
897, 898 (2006) (footnote omitted).  
 57 See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 523, 524-34 (2009) (discussing the rule and its exceptions). 
 58 Id. at 530-32 (footnotes omitted) (containing abundant citations to primary authority). 
 59 See Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P‟ship v. Design Alliance, Inc., 223 P.3d 664, 671 (Ariz. 
2010) (en banc) (“The principal function of the economic loss doctrine, in our view, is to encourage 
private ordering of economic relationships and to uphold the expectations of the parties by limiting a 
plaintiff to contractual remedies for loss of the benefit of the bargain.”); see also Jay M. Feinman, The 
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many states hold that private agreements disclaiming legislatively imposed 
obligations related to computerized personal information are not enforcea-
ble and are void as against public policy.60 Consequently, the duties at issue 
in cybersecurity cases are, in large measure, not a proper subject for private 
ordering. For this reason, and for other reasons that have been explored 
elsewhere,61 the economic loss rule should not foreclose recovery of credit-
monitoring damages.62 However, in Paul v. Providence Health System-
Oregon63 an Oregon appellate court has ruled to the contrary. In that case, a 
thief stole unencrypted patients‟ records from the defendant‟s employee‟s 
car.64 The court held that the patients could not recover pure economic 
damages to cover the expenses they incurred by purchasing credit-
monitoring services to lower the risk of identity theft.65 
II. COURT DECISIONS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Not all courts have viewed credit-monitoring damages favorably. This 
Part discusses court precedent, which failed to recognize the reasonableness 
and value of credit monitoring. It also discusses voluntary offers of credit 
monitoring by businesses and governmental entities, and judicial or admin-
istrative recognition of credit monitoring as part of class-action settlements 
or sanctions.  
  
Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 814 (2006) (discussing the logic of 
private ordering). 
 60 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 300-01. The article explains: 
Many state laws, such as the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, provide 
that a waiver of the data subjects‟ rights is against public policy, and therefore void and un-
enforceable. If that is true, it makes little sense that consumers should bargain and pay for the 
level of cybersecurity protection—and the right to sue for out-of-pocket damages—that they 
desire. Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect that bargaining to occur between individ-
ual consumers and the large corporations that play a pervasive role in modern life.  
Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).  
 61 See id. at 296-303 (discussing the policy concerns that animate the economic loss rule: scope of 
liability, certainty of damages, and delineation of contract-versus-tort). 
 62 See Johnson, supra note 57, at 532 (discussing various causes of actions where damages are not 
barred by the economic loss rule). But see Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App‟x 129, 131-32 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether the economic loss rule barred an award of 
credit-monitoring damages because the plaintiffs failed to allege their negligence and breach of contract 
claims sufficiently). 
 63 240 P.3d 1110 (Or. Ct. App. 2010). 
 64 Id. at 1112. 
 65 Id. at 1116. 
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A. Adverse Decisions 
Although some courts have ordered defendants to provide credit-
monitoring services66 or pay credit-monitoring damages,67 a number of cas-
es have held that credit-monitoring damages are not recoverable in cyberse-
curity tort actions.68 With scant attention to the reasonableness or usefulness 
of credit monitoring as a response to database intrusion and as a means of 
mitigating damages, these courts concluded that, at least on certain facts, 
such expenditures are not compensable.69 
The decisions that are adverse to recovery of compensation for credit-
monitoring expenses generally fall into three categories, which are dis-
cussed later in this Article.70 First, some cases have rejected the plaintiffs‟ 
efforts to analogize credit monitoring to medical monitoring.71 This is sig-
nificant because many states allow plaintiffs to recover compensation for 
the medical examinations that are necessary to detect the emergence of a 
diseased condition caused by toxic exposure.72 Data exposure and toxic 
  
 66 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, Inc., No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 
5014386, at *2-4 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010) (involving an electronic case filing that improperly disclosed 
personal information).  
 67 See 1-800-E. W. Mortg. Co. v. Bournazian, No. 09CV2123, 2010 WL 3038962, at *1-3 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. July 18, 2010) (involving improper removal of confidential employee information). 
 68 See, e.g., Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. March 20, 2008) (holding that “the time and expense of credit monitoring to combat an 
increased risk of future identity theft is not, in itself, an injury that the law is prepared to remedy”). 
Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp held that credit-monitoring costs were not compensable under Indiana 
law. 499 F.3d 629, 635-39 (7th Cir. 2007). However, Pisciotta was a narrow decision. Id. at 636. As 
described by another court in a later case, “[a]fter an in-depth analysis of Indiana law, the appellate 
court [in Pisciotta] upheld the decision [denying credit-monitoring damages] because there was no 
precedent supportive of the opposite conclusion and federal courts sitting in diversity should avoid 
inventing truly novel tort claims on behalf of a state.” Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., 
No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010).  
 69 Some cases contain no analytical discussion, but merely a brief citation to an earlier decision 
denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages. See In re Barnhart, No. 09-bk-01974, 2010 WL 
724703, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. Feb. 26, 2010) (dicta). 
 70 See infra Part III, IV.  
 71 See Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913-14 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that the lack of 
any public health interest differentiates lost data and medical-monitoring cases), aff’d, 380 F. App‟x 689 
(9th Cir. 2010); see also Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280-81 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that New York‟s interest in the public health was greater than the availability 
of a money remedy for an individual whose stolen information is later misused); Kahle v. Litton Loan 
Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-13 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (finding that “identity exposure” cases and 
medical-monitoring cases are not analogous (internal quotation marks omitted)); Key v. DSW Inc., 454 
F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (finding that a victim of identity theft has not suffered recovera-
ble harm as has a victim in the medical-monitoring context). 
 72 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 849-52 (3d Cir. 1990) (differentiating 
compensation for medical monitoring from compensation for the increased risk of future harm and 
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exposure are analogous in that they both create a need for early detection of 
potentially emerging, threatened harm. Second, some decisions have denied 
recovery of credit-monitoring damages on the ground that the plaintiff has 
not suffered a present injury but has merely been exposed to a risk of harm 
in the future.73 Finally, in the third group of cases, the courts declined to 
award credit-monitoring damages because the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
litigate that issue in federal court.74  
B. Voluntary Offers of Credit Monitoring 
Rather than definitively resolving issues relating to credit-monitoring 
costs, recent developments have called decisions denying recovery into 
question. The first of these occurrences relates to business practices. Re-
cognizing the appropriateness of expenditures on credit monitoring,75 data-
base possessors potentially responsible for unauthorized access to data of-
ten voluntarily offer to pay credit-monitoring costs for affected persons for 
a period of time.76 Thus, when Wyndham Hotels and Resorts learned that a 
  
allowing the recovery of medical-monitoring damages under Pennsylvania law covering “only the 
quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm”).  
 73 See infra Part IV.A; see also In re Killian, No. 05-14629-HB, 2009 WL 2927950, at *8-9 
(Bankr. D.S.C. July 23, 2009). Killian was not the typical cybersecurity case. The court did not charge 
the defendant with failing to protect data from unauthorized access. Rather, the complaint alleged that 
the defendant “intentionally communicated or otherwise made the Killians‟ sensitive and personal 
nonpublic information available to the public by placing that information on the Court‟s public records.” 
Id. at *2. The court found that there was “ample legal authority to support a claim that Defendant had a 
duty to refrain from placing the Killians‟ personal information on the public record.” Id. at *8. However, 
the court rejected the plaintiff‟s negligence claim on the ground that the complaint failed to allege com-
pensable damages. The court reasoned: 
The Court must be able to find that the allegations of the Complaint allege an injury that is to 
accrue in the future. In this case, the Killians‟ complaint simply alleges that the cost of credit 
monitoring, which is a preventative remedy, will accrue in the future.  
Id. at *9 (citation omitted).  
 74 See, e.g., Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 CIV 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because “their 
claims are future-oriented, hypothetical, and conjectural”); see also infra Part IV.A.3. 
 75 Even though expenditures on credit-monitoring damages are a reasonable means of mitigating 
the damages that can flow from authorized access to personal information, there is evidence that many 
consumers are unaware or unconvinced of those benefits. In In re TJX Cos. Retail Securities Breach 
Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass. 2008), the court noted that only about three percent of eligible 
persons claimed that the credit-monitoring benefit was part of a database intrusion settlement. Id. at 406.  
 76 See, e.g., Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (stating that the defendants responsible for making personal information temporarily 
available on the Internet “offered to provide one year of credit monitoring to those affected”). In Taylor 
v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 08-CV-13258, 2010 WL 750215 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 3, 2010), the 
defendant, whose “former employee may have sold unauthorized information about plaintiffs to a third 
party,” offered the plaintiffs “a two-year membership in Triple Advantage (a credit monitoring service) 
to help plaintiffs protect their credit.” Id. at *12. Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiffs‟ vicarious 
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sophisticated hacker penetrated its computer system and may have used 
customer information to perpetrate fraudulent transactions, it provided af-
fected customers with credit monitoring for one year at no cost.77 Similarly, 
Countrywide Financial volunteered to provide two years of credit monitor-
ing to millions of persons as a result of a security breach related to their 
mortgage loans.78 
In another controversy, a company that guaranteed federal student 
loans notified 3.3 million persons that their data had been stolen and 
promptly “arranged with credit protection agency Experian to provide af-
fected borrowers with free credit monitoring and protection services.”79 In 
addition, the University of Louisville,80 Harley-Davidson,81 the St. Louis 
Metropolitan Police Department,82 Tulane University,83 the Bank of New 
  
liability claim related to the conduct of the former employee because “plaintiffs have admitted that they 
have suffered no monetary damages nor any impact on their credit report resulting from the possible 
(and unconfirmed) theft of any of their personal information by the former Countrywide employee. 
Without any damages, this claim . . . must fail.” Id. at *13; see also Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 
F.3d 1139, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that the court ordered a thief to provide 97,000 em-
ployees with one year of credit monitoring); TJX, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (discussing a settlement that 
provided affected customers with three years of credit monitoring). 
 77 Letter from Wyndham Hotels & Resorts to Vincent Johnson (June 2010) (on file with author); 
see also Saenz v. Kaiser Permanente Int‟l, No. C 09-5562 PJH, 2010 WL 668038, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
19, 2010) (indicating that the defendants “offered plaintiff and putative members of the class one year of 
professional credit monitoring through Equifax as a remedy for the security breach” but that the plaintiff 
maintained that the offer was inadequate). 
 78 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01988, 2009 
WL 5184352, at *8-9 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (discussing the offer, which some class members ac-
cepted and the subsequent settlement, which the court preliminarily approved). The court stated that 
“[a]pproximately 20% of the 2.4 million [persons initially contacted] accepted Countrywide‟s first offer 
of free credit monitoring.” Id. at *11.  
 79 Data on 3.3M People Stolen, supra note 26. According to a news report published within one 
week of the theft, “[b]orrowers will be receiving letters . . . on how to sign up, gain access to fraud 
resolution representatives, and be provided with identity theft insurance coverage.” Id. 
 80 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing a university‟s disclosure in June 2010 that patient 
information was posted on the Internet for twenty months and indicating that the university “immediate-
ly apologized for the breach, notified the patients or their next of kin, and agreed to pay a credit  moni-
toring agency to watch the affected patients‟ credit for a year”). 
 81 See Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 01365(GBD), 2008 WL 763177, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2008) (indicating that one year of free credit monitoring was provided to thousands 
of persons whose personal information was on a lost laptop). 
 82 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 30-31 (indicating that after the department was “the victim of a cybe-
rattack” in 2010, which an employee facilitated by opening an e-mail, “[t]he department said it would 
work to contact the affected parties and would pay to monitor their credit for a year”). 
 83 John Pope, Tulane Payroll Information Stolen, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 8, 2011, at B6 (indicat-
ing that when a “laptop containing payroll and Social Security information for every full-time and part-
time university employee” was stolen, “[e]ach of Tulane‟s 10,684 employees . . . received a let-
ter . . . offering a year‟s free credit monitoring of their accounts”). 
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York Mellon,84 Ceridien Corporation,85 Ohio State University,86 Holy Cross 
Hospital (Ft. Lauderdale),87 the University of Utah,88 Wachovia Securities,89 
and other potential defendants have made comparable offers voluntarily. 
When hackers stole the personal information of millions of PlayStation 
gamers, Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut called on Sony to pro-
vide affected customers with “financial data security services, including 
free access to credit reporting services.”90 Sony responded by offering a 
year of free credit monitoring to victims of the breach.91 
In Texas, the state left unencrypted information relating to 3.5 million 
persons on an Internet server for more than a year.92 Despite a pending gov-
ernment financial crisis,93 the Texas Comptroller announced that affected 
individuals would receive one year of free credit monitoring.94 
  
 84 See Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 WL 
2643307, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (noting that a bank that lost computer back-up tapes voluntari-
ly offered affected individuals, at “no cost . . . a minimum of 24 months of credit monitoring, $25,000 of 
identity theft insurance . . . [and] reimbursement for certain credit freeze costs”). 
 85 Reilly v. Ceridien Corp., No. 10-5142 (JLL), 2011 WL 735512 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2011) (indicat-
ing that one year of free credit monitoring was provided to victims of a security breach caused by hack-
ing). 
 86 Encarnacion Pyle, Server Hacked at OSU; 760,000 Affected, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), 
Dec. 16, 2010, at A1 (stating that although there was “no indication that any personal information was 
taken or that the incident will result in identity theft for any of the affected people,” the university of-
fered twelve months of free credit-monitoring services as a precaution). 
 87 Jon Burstein, Former Holy Cross Hospital Employee Pleads Guilty to ID Theft, Faces up to 10 
Years in Prison, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2011, at 3B (indicating that one year of credit monitoring 
was offered to 44,000 emergency room patients after a hospital employee improperly accessed 1,500 
patient files). 
 88 Colo. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perpetual Storage, Inc., No. 2:10CV316 DAK, 2011 WL 1231832, at *1 
(D. Utah Mar. 30, 2011) (indicating that the university provided credit monitoring to affected patients 
when a company failed to “to safeguard computer back-up tapes containing highly confidential and 
sensitive medical records and other data”). 
 89 Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *1 (D.N.J. July 31, 
2006) (offering one year of free credit monitoring after a list with thousands of social security numbers 
and other identifying information was lost in the mail). 
 90 Nick Bilton & Brian Stelter, Sony Says PlayStation Hacker Got Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 27, 2011, at B1.  
 91 Free Credit Monitoring for Sony PlayStation Breach Victims, WASH. ST. OFF. ATT‟Y GEN. 
(May 27, 2011, 11:21 AM), http://www.atg.wa.gov/BlogPost.aspx?id=28174 (linking to 
http://us.playstation.com/news/consumeralerts/identity-theft-protection/). 
 92 Patricia Kilday Hart, Comptroller Takes Blame for Personal Data Leak, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 29, 2011, at 1A (indicating that the State replaced an offer of discounted credit 
monitoring with free credit monitoring). 
 93 Dave Mann, Youth Movement, TEX. OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2011, at 4 (“Each day seemingly brings 
unrelenting bad news from every corner of state policy, with lawmakers facing a fiscal crisis and consi-
dering drastic budget cuts to education, health care, criminal justice, nearly everything.”). 
 94 Dave Montgomery, Comptroller “Really Sorry” for Records Breach, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Apr. 29, 2011, at 1B. 
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One recent publication from the insurance field remarked in an article 
about managing cyber risk that “[i]f identity theft or fraud is possible due to 
a breach, many organizations offer free credit monitoring for as long as 
three years.”95 Similarly, a report issued by the federal government stated 
that “a representative of a large financial management company noted that 
offering free credit monitoring services after a breach has become standard 
industry practice.”96 
C. Class Action Settlements 
Many courts have also recently approved class-action settlements in 
cybersecurity cases where the parties intended for portions of the settle-
ments to cover the costs of credit monitoring.97 Indeed, when parties settle 
aggregate claims, the settlement often encompasses only compensation for 
credit monitoring, identify theft insurance, and out-of-pocket costs, such as 
expenses incurred to replace checks or drivers‟ licenses.98 
For example, in In re TJX Cos. Retail Securities Breach Litigation,99 a 
federal court in Massachusetts approved an award of $6.5 million in attor-
neys‟ fees in a class-action suit arising from the theft of 40 million credit 
cardholders‟ personal information.100 In that suit, which was then the “larg-
est retail security breach in history,”101 the settlement included compensa-
tion for credit monitoring and identity theft insurance. Explaining the 
court‟s ruling, the judge wrote: 
The Court . . . is satisfied that the Agreement creates a concrete benefit insofar as it provides 
that [customers returning merchandise without a receipt] could receive credit monitoring ser-
vices. . . . The parties . . . determined with certainty the value, in the form of the cost of the 
credit monitoring subscription, that would be transferred to each unreceipted return customer 
who made a claim. Therefore, unlike the figures attached to other benefits—for which it was 
unclear how many class members, if any, might qualify and what amount they might claim—
the $177,000,000 attributed to this benefit has meaning. Accordingly, the Court is comforta-
  
 95 Learn Strategies for Managing Cyber Risk, BUS. INS., Jan. 3, 2011, at 3, 16. 
 96 U.S. GOV‟T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA 
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS 
UNKNOWN 35 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 97 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009 
WL 5184352, at *8, *12 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (approving a settlement encompassing credit moni-
toring, identity theft insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses). But see In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy 
Litig., No. 00 C 4729, 2009 WL 4799954, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009) (“[T]he class here (indeed, 
probably most classes) would rather have cash than in-kind relief. A check for $60 is more valuable to 
most people than getting free credit monitoring services with a retail value of that amount.”). 
 98 See Countrywide, 2009 WL 5184352, at *8, *12 (approving a settlement encompassing credit 
monitoring, identity theft insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses). 
 99 584 F. Supp. 2d 395 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 100 Id. at 397, 408. 
 101 Id. at 397. 
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ble characterizing this litigation as creating $177,000,000 in potential benefits for the 
class . . . .
102
 
Similarly, in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Customer Data Secu-
rity Breach Litigation,103 a federal court in Kentucky approved a class-
action settlement, which included, notably, “[f]ree credit monitoring,” find-
ing that “the value of this settlement is substantial.”104 Likewise, in Barel v. 
Bank of America,105 a federal court in Pennsylvania approved a class-action 
settlement that provided non-customers, whose credit reports had been im-
properly accessed by the defendant, with four months of credit monitoring 
and other relief.106 Judicial endorsement of these settlements strongly sug-
gests that credit monitoring is a legitimate form of damages resulting from 
exposure of personal information to unauthorized access. 
In addition, in cases of data-security breaches, federal law authorizes 
the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs to provide individuals 
“subject to a reasonable risk for the potential misuse of any sensitive per-
sonal information” with “[o]ne year of credit monitoring services consisting 
of automatic daily monitoring of at least 3 relevant credit bureau reports.”107 
In a case involving a lost laptop containing the information of 26.5 million 
veterans, the National Law Journal reported that money from the U.S. 
Treasury would provide compensation for “actual harm, such as physical 
symptoms of emotional distress or expenses incurred for credit monitor-
ing.”108 
In another government data-security breach, an FDIC intern improper-
ly used agency information to take out fraudulent loans in the names of 
FDIC employees.109 The agency reacted by “promptly notifying affected 
employees and offering them 2 years of credit monitoring services.”110 
D. Judicial and Administrative Sanctions 
There is other evidence that credit monitoring is an appropriate ex-
penditure. For example, courts and administrative agencies have imposed 
sanctions requiring defendants to provide such services to persons at risk of 
identity theft due to breaches of data security. In United States v. Ja-
  
 102 Id. at 409 (footnote omitted). 
 103 No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2010 WL 3341200 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 23, 2010). 
 104 Id. at *10. 
 105 255 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dealing with the settlement of claims related to improperly 
obtained credit reports). 
 106 Id. at 397. 
 107 38 C.F.R. § 75.118 (2009). 
 108 Vets Will Share $20M in Data Privacy Breach, NAT‟L L.J., Feb. 2, 2009, at 16. 
 109 GAO REPORT, supra note 96, at 22-23. 
 110 Id. at 23 n.39. 
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nosko,111 the First Circuit ordered a detainee to pay restitution after the court 
convicted him of hacking into a prison‟s computer system.112 The award 
reimbursed the county for money that it spent on credit-monitoring services 
that it offered to employees whose personal information was contained in 
the hacked databases.113 Retired Supreme Court Justice David Souter, sit-
ting by designation, found that the county‟s actions were a reasonable re-
sponse to the hacking and were, therefore, compensable.114 Justice Souter 
wrote: 
It should go without saying that an employer whose personnel records have been exposed to 
potential identity thieves responds reasonably when it makes enquiry to see whether its em-
ployees have been defrauded. This act of responsibility is foreseeable to the same degree that 
indifference to employees‟ potential victimization would be reproachable. It is true, of 
course, that once they were told of the security breach, the individual employees and former 
workers involved in this case could themselves have made credit enquiries to uncover any 
fraud, but this in no way diminishes the reasonableness of the Facility‟s investigation 
prompted by the risk that its security failure created. And quite aside from decency to its 
workers, any employer would reasonably wish to know the full extent of criminality when 
reporting the facts to law enforcement authorities.
115
 
In another case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Linea Latina De Accidentes, 
Inc.,116 attachments to a litigant‟s electronic court filing improperly dis-
closed “birth dates, names of minors, financial account numbers, and at 
least one social security number.”117 After the litigant failed to remedy the 
problem, a federal court in Minnesota ordered the party‟s counsel to “pro-
vide a subscription for 12 months to Experian‟s Triple Advantage Credit 
Monitoring to each individual whose social security number or date of birth 
was improperly disclosed, except those individuals who respond in writ-
ing . . . that they do not wish to receive the service.”118 
Similarly, in Weakley v. Redline Recovery Services, LLC,119 a federal 
court in California found that an attorney had filed documents containing 
social security numbers recklessly and in bad faith, and that he made the 
documents available on the Internet for more than three weeks.120 The court 
  
 111 642 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 112 Id. at 41-42; see also Sheri Qualters, Inmate Who Computer-Hacked Guards Must Pay Restitu-
tion, NAT‟L. L.J. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202489772767 
(discussing the First Circuit‟s decision); Sheri Qualters, Should Prison Hacker Pay for Credit Monitor-
ing as Restitution? 1st Circuit to Decide, NAT‟L. L.J. (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/
PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202477328396 (discussing the appeal in United States v. Janosko). 
 113 Janosko, 642 F.3d at 41.  
 114 Id. at 42. 
 115 Id.  
 116 No. 09-3681 (JNE/JJK), 2010 WL 5014386 (D. Minn. Nov. 24, 2010). 
 117 Id. at *1. 
 118 Id. at *4. 
 119 No. 09cv1423 BEN (WMC), 2011 WL 1522413 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011). 
 120 Id. at *1-2. 
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ordered the responsible attorney to pay for five years of credit monitoring to 
protect the plaintiff from identity theft.121 
In Connecticut, the state insurance commission fined a health insurer 
for a major data-security breach and untimely notification of affected per-
sons.122 The fine was part of an agreement requiring the insurer to provide 
two years of free credit monitoring to insureds.123 
E. Indicia of Legitimacy 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, business practice, litigation 
settlement, and judicial and administrative sanction developments, along 
with court opinions referencing the utility of credit monitoring,124 strongly 
suggest that expenditures on credit monitoring are prudent and appropriate 
when defendants place computerized personal information at risk. To that 
extent, plaintiffs should be able to recover such amounts in tort litigation 
because those expenditures are reasonably necessary to mitigate the harm 
that may flow from a cybersecurity breach. To conclude otherwise would 
be to suggest that corporate, judicial, and administrative officials now rou-
tinely sanction the waste of resources when they approve voluntary offers, 
settlements, fines, or sanctions involving credit-monitoring expenditures. 
Moreover, it is easier to justify a legal duty to provide credit-
monitoring services when such provision is a customary business practice 
in cases of breached data security.125 In such an environment, imposition of 
liability for credit-monitoring damages will neither disrupt community 
practices nor impose unprecedented obligations. This is important because 
  
 121 Id. at *2 (assessing the cost of credit monitoring at $900). 
 122 Ryan Doran, Privacy Breaches Spell Tighter Controls of Patient Records, FAIRFIELD COUNTY 
BUS. J., Dec. 6, 2010, at 4. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See, e.g., Dixon-Rollins v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. 09-0646, 2010 WL 3749454, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2010) (indicating that use of a credit-monitoring service revealed the improper 
listing of a debt on a credit report); Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-
1185-WSD, 2010 WL 3545389, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2010) (stating, in the context of a securities 
law class action, that the plaintiff used “credit monitoring . . . to provide „early warning‟ alerts for prob-
lem loans in the portfolio”); Saccato v. Gordon, No. 10-6111-HO, 2010 WL 3395295, at *2 (D. Or. 
Aug. 26, 2010) (noting that the plaintiff‟s use of credit monitoring disclosed an allegedly erroneous debt 
entry).  
 125 For instance, in determining whether a defendant breached a duty, courts frequently refer to the 
relevant industry practices. See Glow v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 652 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (“It is the jury‟s duty to consider industry practice and available alternatives as part of its calculus 
to determine whether defendant‟s conduct was negligent.”). However, in Rowe v. UniCare Life & 
Health Insurance Co., the court stated that the fact that the defendants attempted to mitigate the costs of 
credit monitoring by offering free credit monitoring for a year did “not resolve the question of whether 
credit monitoring costs are actual damages.” No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 
2010). 
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among the policy considerations relevant to whether a duty should be im-
posed are the resulting “consequences to the community.”126 
III. ANALOGY TO MEDICAL-MONITORING DAMAGES 
According to Professor Dan B. Dobbs, in the personal injury context, 
“[n]o rule of law excludes recovery for expenses of diagnosis or limits the 
recovery to expenses of treatment.”127 Moreover, the rule that a party must 
prove damages with reasonable certainty “does not, even taken literally, 
exclude recovery for expenses of minimizing damages or of determining 
the nature and extent of the plaintiff‟s injury.”128 Consistent with these prin-
ciples, many states permit toxic-exposure plaintiffs to recover the costs of 
medical monitoring.129 As one court noted, “[a] medical monitoring award 
aids presently healthy plaintiffs who have been exposed to an increased risk 
of future harm to detect and treat any resultant harm at an early stage.”130 
In Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.,131 the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, en banc, made a similar ruling. The Meyer court, discussing an earlier 
decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.,132 stated: 
  
 126 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).  
 127 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1(3), at 651 (2d ed. 1993). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990) (differentiating 
compensation for medical monitoring from compensation for the increased risk of future harm and 
allowing the recovery of medical-monitoring damages under Pennsylvania law covering “only the 
quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm”); 
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (holding “that the cost 
of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable 
medical expert testimony, that the need for future monitoring is a reasonably certain consequence of a 
plaintiff‟s toxic exposure and that the recommended monitoring is reasonable”). According to the Su-
preme Court of Nevada: 
Since the landmark decision Askey v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 477 
N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (1984), in which a New York appeals court acknowledged medical moni-
toring could be a recoverable damage, appellate courts in at least ten other states have recog-
nized claims for medical monitoring. In addition, federal courts have interpreted state law in 
at least seven additional states and the District of Columbia as permitting claims for medical 
monitoring. 
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 438 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (footnote omitted). 
But see Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 9 (Miss. 2007) (holding that the state 
does not recognize medical-monitoring claims in the absence of proof of physical injury); Lowe v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 182 (Or. 2008) (en banc) (holding that a smoker was not entitled 
to medical-monitoring damages based on accumulated exposure to cigarette smoke). 
 130 Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiffs 
had standing to seek medical-monitoring damages related to potentially defective implants). 
 131 220 S.W.3d 712 (Mo. 2007) (en banc). 
 132 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). 
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The Elam court recognized that among the potential damages sustained by a plaintiff who is 
exposed to a toxin is the need for medical monitoring for the “early detection of serious dis-
ease from the chronic exposure” to toxins. The court further reasoned that medical monitor-
ing costs are recoverable because “compensation for necessary medical expenses reasonably 
certain to be incurred in the future rests on well-accepted legal principles.” These “well-
accepted” principles of Missouri law provide that a plaintiff is entitled to recover for the 
prospective consequences of the defendant‟s tortious conduct if the injury is reasonably cer-
tain to occur. Recognizing that a defendant‟s conduct has created the need for future medical 
monitoring does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage when lia-
bility is established under traditional tort theories of recovery.
133
 
Jurisdictions vary in how they state the elements of a medical-
monitoring claim. In general: 
Recovery of medical monitoring costs requires proof that (1) the plaintiff was exposed to a 
toxic substance, (2) the exposure resulted from the defendant‟s negligence, (3) the exposure 
increased the plaintiff‟s risk of serious disease or illness, (4) there exist beneficial medical 
procedures to treat that disease or illness, and (5) those procedures are reasonably neces-
sary.
134
 
For similar reasons, it can be argued that credit monitoring is appro-
priate when there has been a serious breach of data security. Expenditures 
on credit monitoring are necessary to enable the data subject to detect se-
rious kinds of identity theft promptly and take steps to minimize the result-
ing harm. Indeed, it can be argued that credit monitoring is even more ap-
propriate than medical monitoring. Credit-monitoring procedures are not 
physically invasive, do not involve follow-up visits or tests, and rarely pro-
duce “false positives”—results that are erroneously misleading.135 This Part 
explores the analogy between credit-monitoring damages and medical-
monitoring damages in further detail.  
A. Exposure Threshold for Recovery 
Plaintiffs cannot recover medical-monitoring damages in cases of in-
significant exposure to toxic chemicals.136 Similarly, courts should not 
award credit-monitoring damages if only a trivial breach of data security 
occurred. The relevant Latin maxim is de minimis non curat lex, a phrase 
  
 133 Meyer, 220 S.W.3d at 717 (citations omitted) (quoting Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 209).  
 134 Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 12, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted). 
 135 Id. ¶ 21, at 16 (noting that, with respect to medical monitoring, many “procedures are invasive 
and carry health risks that must be weighed against the procedures‟ potential benefits” and “there are 
risks that patients may take false reassurance from the monitoring, or that false positives could lead to 
unnecessary, costly, or dangerous follow-up procedures”). 
 136 See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d. Cir. 1990) (requiring that a plain-
tiff be “significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance” in order to establish a cause of action for 
medical-monitoring damages). 
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that reflects a principle that applies broadly throughout American jurispru-
dence. Literally translated, it means “[t]he law does not concern itself with 
trifles.”137 In the field of torts, this means that a person who is unable to 
prove actual losses is rarely able to recover an award of nominal damag-
es.138 Instead, a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate a significant injury to 
his or her personal interests before the law will grant a remedy.139 Courts 
usually overlook mere technical interference with another‟s rights.140 
The de minimis principle suggests that it is appropriate for judges to 
apply a threshold requirement in cybersecurity litigation when deciding 
whether to award credit-monitoring damages. The courts should permit a 
plaintiff who would not otherwise suffer actual losses from a data-security 
breach to recover credit-monitoring costs only if the defendant has seriously 
exposed the plaintiff‟s personal data to the risk of identity theft to the extent 
that a reasonably prudent person would incur credit-monitoring costs. Pre-
sumably, whether the plaintiff has crossed the threshold for recovery will 
depend on various factors relating to the nature of the breach. According to 
one formulation: 
The factors used in determining whether remedial measures are reasonably necessary include 
the likelihood of future harm, whether a plaintiff (or her data) has been exposed, how much 
of the risk of future harm comes from the exposure instead of from other sources, and the 
cost-effectiveness of remedial measures.
141
  
It may be useful to differentiate between intentional and negligent 
breaches of security. The former category includes hacking, theft of infor-
mation or equipment, and misrepresentations deliberately made to obtain 
data.142 In contrast, the latter category encompasses such things as loss of 
computers, hardware, or media containing data, unintentional exposure of 
  
 137 BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 496 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “de minimis non curat lex”). 
 138 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 51 (4th ed. 2009) 
(indicating that nominal damages are normally available only in actions involving the five intentional 
torts which descended from the writ of trespass). 
 139 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 377, at 1047 (2000).  
 140 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[T]he mere detention of mail 
not in his custody or control amounts to at most a minimal or technical interference with his person or 
effects, resulting in no personal deprivation at all.”), aff’d, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).  
 141 Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 36, at 25-26. According to one court discussing medical monitoring: 
In determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring, the following factors are re-
levant: (1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff‟s exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity 
of the chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed 
plaintiff as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff‟s chances of develop-
ing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the 
public at large of developing the disease; (4) the seriousness of the disease for which the 
plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis. 
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824-25 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
 142 GAO REPORT, supra note 96, at 19 (discussing intentional breaches of data security). 
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data on the Internet, and improper disposal of data.143 In American tort law 
generally, courts routinely extend liability further in cases involving inten-
tionally tortious conduct than in suits based on mere negligence.144 
In some cases, proof that a hostile action caused the cybersecurity 
breach will establish the seriousness of data exposure.145 Thus, if a thief 
steals a laptop containing social security numbers,146 it is easier to conclude 
that affected data subjects are at an increased risk of identity theft, than if 
the owner merely lost or misplaced the laptop.147 The same may be true if 
an unauthorized person opened a new bank account using an affected data 
user‟s social security number soon after the security breach occurred148 or if 
a renegade employee with access to thousands of patient files actually sold 
some of that information to an identity theft ring.149 In contrast, if a server 
containing customers‟ information is only one of many items of hardware 
that thieves took and no evidence exists that the thieves had any interest in 
the data rather than the hardware, it may be difficult to conclude that the 
plaintiffs have reached the exposure threshold for an award of credit-
monitoring damages.150 
  
 143 Id. (discussing negligent breaches of data security). 
 144 See, e.g., Ross v. Holton, 640 S.W.2d 166, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (“In the area of intentional 
torts a submissible punitive damages question is made for the jury once the plaintiff has presented 
sufficient evidence of legal malice—the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or 
excuse.” (citing Pollack v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Mo. 1978) (en banc))). 
 145 Cf. EMU Probes Security Breach of Student Data, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 11, 2011, at 3A (dis-
cussing a situation where “[n]ames, birth dates, and Social Security numbers were improperly accessed 
by two former student employees” who improperly transmitted that information); Editorial, supra note 
29 (discussing the theft of customers‟ names and e-mail addresses). 
 146 Cf. Garnett v. Millennium Med. Mgmt. Res., Inc., No. 10 C 3317, 2010 WL 5140055, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2010) (involving the theft of a portable hard drive during a burglary). 
 147 See Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476 (JBS), 2006 WL 2177036, at *5 (D.N.J. July 
31, 2006) (denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages based on lack of standing, and noting that 
“Plaintiff failed to allege even that her financial information was stolen or ended up in the possession of 
someone who might potentially misuse it. . . . [and] merely alleges that a version of her personal finan-
cial information was lost”); see also Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 31, at 23 (“[S]ome courts have imported the 
„exposure‟ question into data loss cases by requiring plaintiffs to show that their data was either 
(a) acquired or (b) misused by a third party, as opposed to merely lost.”); id. ¶ 65, at 47 (“A plaintiff 
who seeks monitoring costs following a hacking-related breach probably has a greater chance of suffer-
ing identity fraud than a plaintiff who sues after a laptop is lost; their claims should not be treated the 
same.”). 
 148 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2010) (involving similar 
facts). The court stated in the context of a standing inquiry that “[w]ere Plaintiffs-Appellants‟ allega-
tions more conjectural or hypothetical—for example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had 
sued based on the risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future—we would find the threat far 
less credible.” Id. at 1143.  
 149 Burstein, supra note 87 (indicating that the hospital offered one year of free credit monitoring 
to 44,000 patients after the information of some patients had been sold). 
 150 See Stollenwerk v. Tri-W. Health Care Alliance, 254 F. App‟x 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007) (deny-
ing credit-monitoring damages on these facts). 
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Similarly, credit monitoring‟s appropriateness may be a factor of the 
time period for which the defendant exposed the plaintiff‟s data to wrongful 
third-party access and the ease with which third parties could achieve 
access. A court has a stronger basis to conclude that a data subject is at a 
heightened risk for identity theft if the defendant negligently posted person-
al information on the Internet or in another public location for a period of 
months,151 than if the information was accessible for only six days and no 
evidence exists that anyone actually accessed or misused the data.152 The 
same is true if third persons could freely access personal information on the 
web rather than obtain it only via a password and login.153 
Finally, in some cases, it may be appropriate to take into account the 
nature of personal information at issue in determining whether courts 
should award credit-monitoring damages. The loss of data linking a per-
son‟s name, social security number, and birth date is undoubtedly more 
serious than the loss of data involving only a name and e-mail address.154 
It is not possible to state a precise rule defining the threshold for an 
award of credit-monitoring damages. In any given case, many factors may 
be relevant. On the one hand, courts should not permit an award of credit-
monitoring damages in cases where there is no significant threat that the 
affected data subjects will become victims of identity theft. On the other 
hand, an award of credit-monitoring damages should not hinge upon the 
plaintiff‟s showing that the intruder actually misused sensitive personal 
information.155 
  
 151 Kirtley, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing a data security breach at a university where patient 
information was improperly posted on the Internet for twenty months); Jaymes Song, APNewsBreak: 
University Posts Info of 40K Students, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/
education/higher/articles/2010/10/29/apnewsbreak_university_posts_info_of_40k_students/ (stating that 
“Social Security numbers, grades and other personal information of more than 40,000 former University 
of Hawaii students were posted online for nearly a year before being removed” because a faculty mem-
ber studying student success rates uploaded the material to what he believed was a secure server).  
 152 See In re Davis, 430 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff lacked 
standing to recover credit-monitoring damages for alleged harm resulting from improper exposure of 
data for six days). The court noted that the “Plaintiff‟s need for credit monitoring is conjectural or hypo-
thetical.” Id. 
 153 See In re Matthys, No. 09-16585-AJM-13, 2010 WL 2176086, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. May 26, 
2010) (rejecting an invasion of privacy claim related to a court filing that improperly disclosed a social 
security number). 
 154 Cf. Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No. 09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) 
(denying relief on federal standing grounds and noting that “[e]ven assuming that the hackers obtained 
Plaintiff‟s email address, it is highly speculative that they obtained any other information that would be 
necessary to commit identity theft”); Editorial, supra note 29 (discussing the theft of customer names 
and e-mail addresses). 
 155 Cf. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that, in the 
medical-monitoring context, “the appropriate inquiry is not whether it is reasonably probable that plain-
tiffs will suffer harm in the future, but rather whether medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease”). 
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In Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc.,156 a federal court 
in New York dismissed a negligence claim seeking credit-monitoring dam-
ages.157 In that case, a thief stole password-protected laptops from a pension 
consultant‟s office.158 The court held that the plaintiff had failed to demon-
strate a rational basis for serious concerns about the personal information 
contained on the laptops.159 As the court explained:  
Factors giving rise to a demonstrable basis for a serious concern over misuse may include 
evidence of the following: (1) the [lack of] any password-protection for use of the computer 
such that an unsophisticated user could boot the computer and immediately access the file; 
(2) that the person stealing the hard drive was motivated by a desire to access the data and 
had the capabilities to do so; or (3) actual access or misuse of information of the plaintiff or 
another person whose data was stored on the same hard drive. This Court cannot say with 
confidence that New York would recognize a claim if any or all of these elements were met. 
However, the Court can comfortably conclude that New York would not allow a claim to 
proceed where none of these elements are present.
160
 
B. Reasonably Necessary 
The critical question is whether, based on the facts of a case, credit-
monitoring expenditures are reasonably necessary. In this regard, courts 
should give considerable weight to community practices. If a cybersecurity 
breach involves the type of facts that commonly prompt businesses to offer 
credit monitoring to affected persons,161 courts to approve settlements in-
cluding compensation for credit monitoring,162 or governmental entities to 
provide for or require the provision of credit-monitoring services or reim-
bursement for such expenses,163 there should be little question about the 
reasonable necessity of such expenditures.  
While it is important to consider whether credit-monitoring expendi-
tures are cost-effective, it is unreasonable to expect courts to engage in the 
type of economic analysis that will yield a convincing mathematical answer 
to this question. Estimates about the risks and costs of identity theft are 
simply too various to produce convincing results.164 Calculations often un-
reasonably discount or ignore very real considerations, such as the emo-
tional distress, inconvenience, and lost time that result from breaches of 
  
 156 580 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 157 Id. at 275-76. 
 158 Id. at 282. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id.  
 161 See supra Part II.B. 
 162 See supra Part II.C. 
 163 See supra Part II.D. 
 164 For one such effort, see Graves, supra note 5, ¶¶ 79-82, at 56-58. 
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data security.165 Judges can better assess whether expenditures on credit 
monitoring are cost-effective by reference to what businesses, courts, and 
governmental agencies actually do rather than by judicial calculations seek-
ing to quantify the wisdom of credit monitoring through economic analysis. 
In Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care Alliance,166 the Ninth Circuit 
concluded the expenditures on credit monitoring were not reasonably ne-
cessary because the plaintiffs could have reviewed their credit reports for 
free and could have placed a fraud alert in their files.167 However, a once-a-
year free credit report168 is no substitute for daily credit monitoring to detect 
the opening of unauthorized accounts and “a fraud alert is only available for 
ninety days, unless the victim has already suffered fraud.”169 Stollenwerk‟s 
conclusion that there was “no showing that a normally prudent person in 
these circumstances would have taken precautions beyond the free servic-
es” is at odds with recent developments.170 There is now abundant evidence 
showing that businesses,171 courts,172 and government agencies173 often au-
thorize expenditures on credit monitoring, even though affected data sub-
jects could obtain free credit reports each year from credit-reporting agen-
cies and place fraud alerts in their file that would be effective for a limited 
period of time. 
C. Duration of Monitoring 
Medical-monitoring precedent recognizes that the length of time dur-
ing which monitoring is appropriate varies with the facts of a case.174 Courts 
must consider the toxicity of the chemical or other matter at issue, the 
length of the plaintiff‟s exposure, and the foreseeable period during which 
  
 165 See, e.g., id. ¶ 55, at 39 (discussing attempts to calculate average loss incurred by fraud victims 
as measured by “out-of-pocket losses” alone (footnote omitted)).  
 166 254 F. App‟x 664 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 167 Id. at 667. 
 168 The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires each of the nationwide consumer reporting companies—
Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion—to provide persons with a free copy of their credit report, upon 
request, once every twelve months. Facts for Consumers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre34.shtm (last modified Aug. 24, 2010). 
 169 Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 77, at 55. 
 170 Stollenwerk, 254 F. App‟x at 667.  
 171 See supra Part II.B. 
 172 See supra Part II.C. 
 173 See supra Part II.D. 
 174 See Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 361 (La. 1998) (“[T]o ensure that 
only meritorious claims are compensated, plaintiff‟s recovery of medical monitoring costs must be both 
reasonable and limited in duration to the maximum latency period (if known) of the diseases for which 
there is an increased risk.”); see also Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 884 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“The extent 
and duration of diagnostic monitoring is a matter for medical professionals under the supervision of the 
court to decide.”). 
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resulting symptoms of disease or injury may be latent.175 Based on particu-
lar facts, a longer period of monitoring may be more appropriate in one case 
than in another. 
Similarly, the length of time that credit monitoring should continue 
depends on the circumstances. Exposure of highly sensitive personal infor-
mation, such as social security and bank account numbers for a long period 
of time, will undoubtedly call for longer monitoring than brief exposure of 
less significant information. However, there is no binding rule. In some 
cases, the one or two years of credit monitoring that a potential defendant 
offers may be all that the facts warrant.176 In other cases, it may be reasona-
ble to continue monitoring for a longer period of time.177 Little more can be 
said than that, whatever the period, the plaintiff must prove that the pro-
posed length of time for monitoring is reasonably necessary.178 Of course, 
courts will likely greet claims seeking compensation in the form of lifetime 
monitoring with skepticism,179 except in the rarest case. 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST RECOVERY 
An important hurdle to overcome in recovering credit-monitoring 
damages is convincing a court that the victim of a serious cybersecurity 
breach suffers a legally cognizable injury even before the perpetrator steals 
his or her identify.180 Not all courts are willing to accept this proposition, 
and some courts operate under the misconception that a claim for credit-
monitoring damages is a request for compensation for increased risk of 
  
 175 See Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 360-61. 
 176 Cf. Ruiz v. Gap, Inc., 380 F. App‟x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (indicating that although “Califor-
nia courts have not considered whether time and money spent on credit monitoring as the result of the 
theft of personal information are damages sufficient to support a negligence claim,” the court did not 
need to reach that question because the plaintiff “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on 
whether he suffered damages because he offered no evidence on the amount of time and money he spent 
on the credit monitoring, or that Gap‟s offer would not fully recompense him”). 
 177 Cf. Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 361 (stating that medical-monitoring costs should be based on the 
“maximum latency period . . . of the diseases for which there is an increased risk”).  
 178 Cf. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that, in the 
medical-monitoring context, “concerns about the degree of certainty required can easily be accommo-
dated by requiring that a jury be able reasonably to determine that medical monitoring is probably, not 
just possibly, necessary”); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 102 A.D.2d 130, 137 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984) (indicating that expenses for medical monitoring are recoverable as consequential damages “pro-
vided that plaintiffs can establish with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such expenditures 
are „reasonably anticipated‟ to be incurred by reason of their exposure”).  
 179 See Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 n.2, 283-84 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting a negligence claim seeking lifetime monitoring damages). 
 180 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App‟x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) (supplemental opinion). 
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harm.181 This Part explains that credit-monitoring damages are preventive 
expenditures that are wholly distinct from both the unwieldy concept of 
increased risk of harm (which is not a proper basis for measuring damages 
in a cybersecurity case) and from the harm that results if a data-security 
breach ultimately causes identity theft. In addition, this Part argues that, 
contrary to the holdings of some cases, standing principles should not con-
trol the compensability of credit-monitoring damages because issues of 
standing and damages are legally distinguishable. Finally, this Part con-
tends that courts have no basis to hold that plaintiffs cannot recover credit-
monitoring damages from negligent defendants simply because they can 
purchase credit monitoring for themselves in order to self-protect against 
the harm that breaches of cybersecurity cause. 
A. Present Injury Versus Increased Risk of Harm  
A number of cases have held that plaintiffs cannot recover credit-
monitoring damages because, until identity theft occurs, a data subject af-
fected by a cybersecurity breach has not suffered an injury.182 For example, 
in Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Insurance Co.,183 the plaintiff sought to 
recover credit-monitoring costs and other damages when the defendants 
temporarily posted personal information on the Internet.184 In addressing 
those claims, a federal court in Illinois decided several legal issues in the 
plaintiff‟s favor and denied the defendants‟ motion to dismiss.185 However, 
with respect to the claim for credit-monitoring damages, the court wrote: 
[F]ederal courts have accepted the increased risk of future harm as an injury and allowed for 
the recovery of future damages. If Rowe is able to show an increased risk of future harm, the 
Court may admit evidence regarding the cost of credit monitoring services in order to calcu-
  
 181 See Rowe v. UniCare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 5, 2010). 
 182 See, e.g., Krottner, 406 F. App‟x at 131 (stating, in an action arising from the theft of a laptop 
containing employee information, which raised issues related to credit monitoring, that the “mere danger 
of future harm, unaccompanied by present damage, will not support a negligence action” (quoting 
Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (W.D. Mich. 
2006). In Hendricks, the plaintiff sued not for negligence, but for breach of contract and violation of the 
Michigan Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 780-81. In denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages, 
the court noted that Michigan does not permit recovery of medical-monitoring damages, writing: 
There is no existing Michigan statutory or case law authority to support plaintiff‟s position 
that the purchase of credit monitoring constitutes either actual damages or a cognizable loss. 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that Michigan‟s highest court would reject a novel  legal 
theory of damages which is based on a risk of injury at some indefinite time in the future. 
Id. at 783. 
 183 No. 09 C 2296, 2010 WL 86391 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010). 
 184 Id. at *1.  
 185 Id. at *9.  
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late the damages that can be attributed to that increased risk. Nonetheless, the costs of credit 
monitoring services are not a present harm in and of themselves. Instead, they may be useful 
in the evaluating some cognizable future harm.
186
 
This line of reasoning misses the point. In cases of breached data secu-
rity, the defendant must incur the costs of credit monitoring to minimize the 
special threat of economic harm resulting from data exposure, regardless of 
whether identity theft ever occurs. As such, credit-monitoring expenses are 
independent of, and distinguishable from, whatever harm may mature in the 
future if a perpetrator ultimately misuses the personal data placed at risk. 
Credit-monitoring costs are not merely a factor in valuing increased risk of 
harm. 
1. Two Categories of Harm 
To put the matter somewhat differently, it is useful to segregate the 
damages resulting from data exposure into two categories: first, costs that 
plaintiffs reasonably incur to prevent identity theft when defendants se-
riously breach data security, and second, costs resulting from identity theft. 
Expenses falling within the first category include the costs of credit moni-
toring and certain out-of-pocket expenditures, such as replacing drivers‟ 
licenses, changing account numbers, and ordering new checkbooks. If there 
is credible evidence of a serious data-security breach,187 the defendant 
should incur these types of expenses because they minimize the likelihood 
of future economic harm. This is especially true because such expenditures 
are typically modest in comparison to the harm that can result from identity 
theft. 
In contrast, expenses falling within the second category, namely losses 
resulting from identity theft, are intended not to prevent harm that the plain-
tiff can avoid by the exercise of reasonable care, but to redress harm al-
ready proximately caused. If the plaintiff has accrued such losses prior to 
trial, the plaintiff should be able to recover them. However, such evidence 
is often unavailable because the risk of identity theft has not yet come to 
fruition. In that case, courts should deny compensation for damages relating 
to the second category because it is a matter of speculation whether identity 
theft will ever occur, and the law routinely denies recovery for damages not 
proven with reasonable certainty.188 There is no reason to follow a different 
rule in cybersecurity cases. 
Courts should focus on the two specified categories of damages (costs 
incurred to prevent harm and costs resulting from identity theft) and reject 
  
 186 Id. at *7. 
 187 See supra Part III.A (discussing the threshold for recovery of credit-monitoring damages). 
 188 E.g., Landry v. Spitz, 925 A.2d 334, 347 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). 
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the idea that cybersecurity cases provide compensation for increased risk of 
harm. Increased risk of harm is an unworkable measure for damages in 
these types of cases because there is no way to estimate with reasonable 
precision the degree to which data exposure increases the risk of identity 
theft. 
2. Contrast to Loss of a Chance 
A useful contrast can be drawn by reference to the concepts of in-
creased harm (alternatively known as “loss of a chance”189) that have crys-
tallized in the field of medical-malpractice liability. Many courts permit a 
patient harmed by a physician‟s negligence to recover compensation for an 
increased risk of harm.190 For example, this may include the increased 
chance of dying that results from negligent failure to detect or disclose a 
diseased condition which, though capable of treatment, grows more severe 
as a result of delayed attention.191 Courts award increased-risk-of-harm 
damages because generally accepted scientific principles have made it poss-
ible to calculate percentage increases in the chances of harm with reasona-
ble precision.192 For example, in Matsuyama v. Birnbaum,193 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the loss of chance doctrine and 
held that “[i]n order to prove loss of chance, a plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the physician‟s negligence caused the 
plaintiff‟s likelihood of achieving a more favorable outcome to be dimi-
nished.”194 Explaining the operation of the doctrine, Chief Justice Margaret 
H. Marshall wrote: 
We reject the defendants‟ contention that a statistical likelihood of survival is a “mere possi-
bility” and therefore “speculative.” . . . [S]urvival rates are not random guesses. They are es-
timates based on data obtained and analyzed scientifically and accepted by the relevant med-
ical community as part of the repertoire of diagnosis and treatment, as applied to the specific 
facts of the plaintiff‟s case. . . . The key is the reliability of the evidence available to the fact 
finder. . . . [F]or certain conditions, medical science has progressed to the point that physi-
cians can gauge a patient‟s chances of survival to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
  
 189 See Alberts v. Schultz, 975 P.2d 1279, 1281, 1283 (N.M. 1999) (recognizing the “loss of a 
chance” doctrine and stating that “[s]ome courts seek to clarify the theory by use of the term „increased 
risk of harm‟” (quoting Gardner v. Pawliw, 696 A.2d 599, 613 (1997))).  
 190 See, e.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 403 (N.J. 1990).  
 191 See O‟Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013, 1018 (8th Cir. 1971). 
 192 See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828 n.23 (Mass. 2008). The court observed that: 
The highest courts of at least twenty States and the District of Columbia have adopted the 
loss of chance doctrine. . . . Ten States‟ high courts have, in contrast, refused to adopt the 
loss of chance doctrine. . . . Other States‟ high courts have not addressed the issue or have 
explicitly left the question open. The Draft Restatement discusses loss of chance but „takes 
no position on this matter, leaving it for future development and future Restatements‟. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 193 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008). 
 194 Id. at 832.  
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and indeed routinely use such statistics as a tool of medicine. . . . The availability of such ex-
pert evidence on probabilities of survival makes it appropriate to recognize loss of chance as 
a form of injury.
195
 
However, the Matsuyama court was quick to point out the limits of a 
doctrine permitting recovery in a tort action for increased risk of harm. The 
court cautioned: “[O]ur decision today is limited to loss of chance in medi-
cal malpractice actions. . . . [because] reliable expert evidence establishing 
loss of chance is more likely to be available in a medical malpractice case 
than in some other domains of tort law.”196 
In contrast to the field of medical services, there are no established 
scientific principles that can quantify increased risk of identity theft in cy-
bersecurity cases. Consequently, it is inappropriate for courts to base com-
pensation in such cases on increased risk of harm. Rather, courts should 
award damages only for losses that the plaintiff can prove with reasonable 
certainty. In many instances, credit-monitoring costs and other measures 
intended to prevent identity theft are reasonable, appropriate, and foreseea-
ble consequences of a defendant‟s negligent failure to protect data from 
unauthorized access or to promptly disclose a security breach.197 In some 
instances, it is also possible to establish, with reasonable certainty, losses 
that resulted from identity theft linked to unprotected personal data.198 How-
ever, courts should not award damages for mere increased risk of harm in 
cases where identity theft has not occurred.  
3. Differentiating Damages from Standing 
It is important to distinguish proof of damages from standing to litigate 
in federal court. Article III‟s “case” or “controversy” requirement necessi-
  
 195 Id. at 833-34.  
 196 Id. at 834-35. 
 197 For example, when Sony‟s PlayStation Network was hacked, resulting in 77 million accounts 
being jeopardized, Sony attempted to “win back customers . . . with free credit monitoring.” Sony Offers 
Credit Monitoring to Playstation Network Customers, MYCREDITSPECIALIST.COM, 
http://blog.mycreditspecialist.com/2011/05/11/sony-offers-credit-monitoring-to-playstation-network-
customers/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011); see also Patrick Klepek, PSN Hacked: What Sony’s Security 
Breach Means for You (And What Comes Next), GIANT BOMB (Apr. 27, 2011), 
http://www.giantbomb.com/news/psn-hacked-what-sonys-security-breach-means-for-you-and-what-
comes-next/3092/. One customer stated that Sony‟s offer of credit monitoring “is the single biggest item 
in Sony‟s apology” which will help prevent its customers from falling prey to “phishing scams, at-
tempted address changes . . . and other chicanery for years to come.” Sony to Offer Help with Credit 
Monitoring, GAMEWIT (May 1, 2011, 1:36 AM), http://gamewit.blogs.pressdemocrat.com/13485/sony-
to-offer-help-with-credit-monitoring/.  
 198 Johnson, supra note 1, at 299-300 (explaining how out-of-pocket damages are “susceptible to 
proof with a high degree of certainty” because the plaintiff can introduce receipts as evidence of ex-
penses). 
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tates proof of injury in fact.199 As explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life:200 
[O]ur cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains 
three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) “actual or immi-
nent, not „conjectural‟ or „hypothetical.‟” Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “spe-
culative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”201 
In federal cybersecurity litigation, courts have addressed the Constitu-
tional standing requirement. Thus, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,202 
Judge Kenneth F. Ripple wrote for the Seventh Circuit: 
Many . . . cases have concluded that the federal courts lack jurisdiction because plaintiffs 
whose data has been compromised, but not yet misused, have not suffered an injury-in-fact 
sufficient to confer Article III standing. We are not persuaded by the reasoning of these cas-
es. As many of our sister circuits have noted, the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied 
by a threat of future harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk 
of future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant‟s actions. 
We concur in this view. Once the plaintiffs‟ allegations establish at least this level of injury, 
the fact that the plaintiffs anticipate that some greater potential harm might follow the defen-
dant‟s act does not affect the standing inquiry.203 
Cases decided subsequent to Pisciotta have generally reached the same 
conclusion,204 although there is authority to the contrary.205 However, for 
present purposes, the critical point is that federal issues related to standing 
are different and properly distinguishable from state-law issues related to 
tort damages.206 Whether or not an increased risk of identity theft gives one 
  
 199 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 200 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  
 201 Id. at 560 (second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
 202 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).  
 203 Id. at 634 (footnotes omitted).  
 204 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that allega-
tions that the theft of a laptop subjected thousands of employees to an increased risk of future identity 
theft was sufficient to establish injury-in-fact standing). 
 205 See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1051-52 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (finding 
that the plaintiff lacked standing because the alleged injury was not “imminent” but noting that other-
wise “[s]ubsequent to the Seventh Circuit‟s decision in Pisciotta, district courts have consistently deter-
mined that claims of increased risk of identity theft resulting from security breaches sufficiently allege 
an injury-in-fact to confer Article III standing to those persons bringing such claims”); In re Davis, 430 
B.R. 902, 907 (D. Colo. 2010) (finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because the harm resulting 
from improper exposure of data for six days was not “actual” or “imminent” where there was no evi-
dence that the data was “accessed or misused” (first and second internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 206 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 406 F. App‟x 129, 131 (9th Cir. 2010) (supplemental opinion) 
(citing Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 624-25 (2004)).  
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standing to assert a cybersecurity claim should not depend on whether a 
plaintiff can recover damages for increased risk of harm under state law. It 
also should not mean that credit-monitoring expenditures are not a com-
pensable form of loss resulting from a security breach.207 Moreover, parties 
do not litigate all cybersecurity cases in federal court.208 To that extent, fed-
eral court precedent on standing is unlikely to present a useful guide to re-
solve state-law issues related to tort damages.  
B. Self-Protection Against This Type of Loss 
The American Law Institute‟s project on tort liability for economic 
loss is now in abeyance, and none of the project‟s drafts were ever ap-
proved.209 However, Council Draft No. 2 proposed that there should be no 
liability for negligently-caused, pure economic loss if “the claimant reason-
ably could have, by contract with the actor or through an intermediary, pro-
tected itself from the loss.”210 Thus, in assessing the compensability of cre-
dit-monitoring damages, it is fair to ask whether the courts should bar re-
covery for this form of loss because, before the cybersecurity breach oc-
curred, the plaintiff could have bargained with the defendant about what 
damages he or she could recover. In addition, a separate, but related, ques-
tion is whether a potential plaintiff is foreclosed from recovering credit-
monitoring costs in cybersecurity tort actions when the plaintiff had the 
ability to self-protect against unauthorized use of personal information by 
purchasing credit-monitoring services. 
  
 207 See id. (holding, in a cybersecurity action, that although the plaintiffs “pled an injury-in-fact for 
purposes of Article III standing” they did not “adequately [plead] damages for purposes of their state-
law claims”). But see Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060(RMB)(RLE), 2010 
WL 2643307, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and, if they 
had standing, they would also be unable to prove damages).  
 208 See supra Part II. 
 209 The American Law Institute states: 
The Council approved the start of the project in 2004. Thus far, no part of the work has been 
approved by the Council or by the membership. Professor Mark Gergen resigned as the 
project‟s Reporter in late 2007; the project is in abeyance while the Director seeks a succes-
sor Reporter. 
Johnson, supra note 57, at 535 n.60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting material previously 
posted at Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, AM. L. INST., 
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=15). Although work on the Res-
tatement (Third) of Torts has been underway for roughly twenty years, and many parts have been com-
pleted, numerous important subjects remain to be addressed. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Vast Domain 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 29, 29-35 (2010), available at 
http://lawreview.law.wfu.edu/files/2011/01/Johnson_Forum.pdf (surveying challenges relating to the 
unfinished work). 
 210 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS § 8(3)(c)(i) (Council 
Draft No. 2, 2007). 
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In thinking about these questions, it is useful to note that the proposed 
Restatement language changed during the drafting process. The first draft 
submitted to the American Law Institute Council in October 2006 proposed 
that there should be no liability for negligence that causes pure economic 
loss if “the claimant could have obtained redress for the harm from the ac-
tor by contract with the actor or through an intermediary.”211 However, the 
Reporter revised that same provision in the second Council draft in October 
2007 by inserting the word “reasonably.” The second Council draft pro-
posed that there should be no liability for negligently caused pure economic 
loss if “the claimant reasonably could have, by contract with the actor or 
through an intermediary, protected itself from the loss.”212 The insertion of 
the word “reasonably” was significant in terms of the sweep of the pro-
posed provision. That word narrowed the range of cases in which hypothet-
ical contract remedies would limit recovery in tort cases for pure economic 
losses to only those cases where it would have been reasonable under the 
existing circumstances for the plaintiff to seek contractual protection. By 
including the word “reasonably,” the proffered Restatement rule no longer 
reflected a broad preference for contract remedies in any case in which a 
contract remedy might be theoretically possible. Rather, the revised rule, 
framed in terms of reasonableness, would have “separate[d] tort and con-
tract claims by encouraging parties to allocate risk contractually”213 only in 
the range of cases where contractual protection was reasonably feasible. 
1. Not a Proper Subject for Bargaining 
As noted earlier, the language of state security breach notification laws 
strongly suggests that the data-protection and the breach-disclosure obliga-
tions that they impose are not a proper subject for bargaining between data 
possessors and data subjects.214 Agreements that vary those duties are nor-
mally void as against public policy.215 
Of course, bargaining about remedies is not the same as bargaining 
about duties. Nevertheless, the fact that bargaining about cybersecurity du-
ties may be futile is a good basis for concluding that a reasonable person 
would not bargain about related cybersecurity remedies. To that extent, 
  
 211 Id. § 8(4)(c)(i). The draft stated that: 
(4) An actor who unintentionally (and without dishonesty or disloyalty) causes pure econom-
ic loss is not subject to negligence or strict liability in tort for the loss . . . when . . . (c) liabili-
ty is unnecessary to deter the conduct or avoid or redress the harm because (i) the claimant 
could have obtained redress for the harm from the actor by contract with the actor or through 
an intermediary . . . . 
Id. 
 212 Id. § 8(3)(c)(i) (emphasis added). 
 213 City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 225, 231 (Super. Ct. 2000).  
 214 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 215 See supra Part I.C.2. 
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contracting with a defendant is not a reasonable alternative for protecting 
oneself against the costs of credit monitoring that are made reasonably ne-
cessary by a breach of cybersecurity. 
Furthermore, because data about any given person is held by a large 
and ultimately unpredictable range of entities, it would be unreasonable to 
expect persons to bargain with all possible defendants over liability for cre-
dit-monitoring damages. In that case, “[c]onsumers would spend an inordi-
nate amount of resources on efforts to perform often duplicative, time-
consuming tasks relating to assessment of the risks of injury and the need 
for economic protection.”216 
In assessing whether bargaining provides a reasonable option for a po-
tential plaintiff to safeguard economic interests, it is important to consider 
the relative economic positions of the parties. Such facts bear upon the is-
sue of whether the plaintiff had adequate bargaining power to make con-
tractual protection a reasonable possibility. 
Where the defendant, acting from a position of economic advantage, 
deals with the plaintiff on a “take it or leave it basis,” bargaining for reme-
dies related to breaches of cybersecurity may not be feasible. For example, 
many cybersecurity breaches have involved unauthorized access to univer-
sity alumni records.217 A graduate of a university might theoretically suc-
ceed in bargaining with the university to remove his or her name from some 
database on a take it or leave it basis, such as by purging the graduate‟s 
name from the mailing lists for the university magazine or fundraising. But 
it seems fanciful to suggest that the graduate could negotiate with the uni-
versity over the availability of credit-monitoring damages for losses that 
may occur if the graduate remains on those lists. Moreover, it is highly un-
likely that, under any circumstances, the graduate could reach a bargain 
with the university obliging the latter to remove the graduate‟s name from 
its academic records databases, or to pay for credit monitoring if a perpetra-
tor breaches the security of those records. 
2. Collateral Sources and Causation Principles 
Theoretically, one might argue that plaintiffs should not recover cre-
dit-monitoring damages because potential plaintiffs could obtain credit-
monitoring insurance for themselves prior to any unauthorized intrusion 
into or revelation of their data. A federal court in Michigan spotted, but did 
not explore, this issue. In denying recovery of credit-monitoring damages 
  
 216 Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liabili-
ty, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 1026, 1042 (1989) (book review).  
 217 White Paper, An Examination of Database Breaches at Higher Education Institutions, at 1, 
http://www.appsecinc.com/techdocs/whitepapers/Higher-Ed-Whitepaper-Edited.pdf (last visited Sept. 
20, 2011). 
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under breach of contract and deceptive trade practices theories, the court 
observed that “perhaps it would be prudent for everyone to monitor their 
credit.”218  
However, even if one assumes that it is unreasonable for a potential 
plaintiff not to buy credit-monitoring protection as a matter of course, that 
failure should have no bearing on the defendant‟s liability for credit-
monitoring expenditures for at least two reasons. First, the collateral-source 
rule,219 which is still widely followed outside of the medical-malpractice 
context,220 holds that the fact that the plaintiff has insurance does not reduce 
the defendant‟s liability.221 To hold otherwise would undercut the incentive 
for persons to self-protect against the costs of accidents. When persons pur-
chase insurance, they intend to protect their own interests and not the inter-
ests of potential defendants. 
Second, a plaintiff‟s failure to purchase credit-monitoring services 
should not be treated as a form of contributory negligence, comparative 
negligence, or comparative fault.222 For conduct to constitute a defense 
within those categories, it must have unreasonably multiplied the chances 
that the injury for which recovery is sought would occur.223 Unlike jaywalk-
ing into a busy street or using a defective electrical appliance in a wet loca-
tion, the failure to purchase credit-monitoring insurance does not multiply 
  
 218 Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (W.D. Mich. 2006). 
 219 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. c, at 514 (1979) (“The rule that collateral 
benefits are not subtracted from the plaintiff‟s recovery applies to . . . [i]nsurance policies, whether 
maintained by the plaintiff or a third party.”); see also Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Colla-
teral Source Rule: Modern Theories of Tort Law and a Proposal for Practical Application , 47 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1075, 1119 (1997) (“Many states have not changed the traditional rule and some that have 
changed it have had the statute overturned by state supreme courts.”). 
 220 See Kenneth S. Abraham, What Is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort 
Reform, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 190-91 (1992) (stating that the collateral source rule is a “traditional rule” 
but has been abolished in numerous jurisdictions in medical malpractice cases). While “firmly en-
trenched in the American jurisprudence of the law of damages for over a century,” the collateral source 
rule has been the source of debate for many scholars. Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards Jr., 
Who Is Winning the Collateral Source Rule War? The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (2000).  
 221 See Joseph M. Perillo, The Collateral Source Rule in Contract Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
705, 706 (2009) (stating that under tort principles, “damages assessed against a tortfeasor generally are 
not diminished by any payments received by the injured party from medical insurance, pension and 
disability plans, or any sources other than the tortfeasor or the tortfeasor‟s insurer”). 
 222 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 19-20 (differentiating contributory negligence, com-
parative negligence, and comparative fault). 
 223 A defendant seeking to base a defense on the plaintiff‟s negligence must prove that the alleged 
negligence was a legal cause of the plaintiff‟s injuries. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 4 (2000) (discussing “Proof of Plaintiff‟s Negligence and Legal Causa-
tion”). The same causation rules apply in evaluating the conduct of plaintiffs and defendants. Id. § 4 
cmt. d. A “defendant‟s conduct can never be a factual cause unless the chances of harm to the plaintiff 
have been multiplied.” VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS: A STUDENT‟S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF 
TORTS 117 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing Reynolds v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885)). 
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the chances of an accident. Failure to subscribe to credit monitoring does 
not make a breach of cybersecurity more likely. 
V. THE CASE FOR CREDIT-MONITORING DAMAGES 
There are strong arguments in favor of holding data possessors liable 
for credit-monitoring damages in cases involving negligently caused 
breaches of information security. As explained below, these arguments fall 
into two broad categories. The first deals with effective deterrence of defi-
cient data practices.224 The second concerns efficient allocation of the eco-
nomic losses that inevitably arise from the widespread use of digital per-
sonal information in contemporary life. 
A. Deterrence of Deficient Data Practices 
Defendants who are not held accountable for the losses they negligent-
ly cause often have an insufficient incentive to exercise care and thereby 
minimize the costs of preventable harm. This is as true with respect to data 
possessors as it is with regard to other putative defendants. Moreover, it is 
as true concerning losses resulting from inadequate data security as it is 
with damages arising from threats of physical injury. However, tort law can 
play an important role in deterring unnecessary losses. It does this by pro-
viding a legal mechanism through which those who neglect to exercise care 
are called to account for harm that they could have avoided. 
At various times, courts have imposed liability for the purpose of de-
terring negligent data practices. For example, in Remsburg v. Docusearch, 
Inc.,225 a man purchased information about a woman‟s workplace address 
from an Internet-based investigation service, then went to that location and 
killed her.226 In a subsequent wrongful death action, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire held that a private investigator or information broker who 
sells information to a client pertaining to a third party has a duty to the third 
party to exercise reasonable care in disclosing that information.227 The court 
  
 224 That such deficiencies exist is beyond dispute. See, e.g., Doran, supra note 122 (“33 percent of 
medical practices said they did not conduct a security risk analysis of their electronic health 
records . . . . ”). In particular, law firms have been slow to recognize cybersecurity threats and reluctant 
to disclose information about data security breaches. See Karen Sloan, Firms Slow to Awaken to Cyber-
security Threat, NAT‟L L.J., Mar. 8, 2010, at 5 (indicating that law firms may be targeted not just by run-
of-the-mill hackers but by “advanced persistent threats,” spying for a long period of time to obtain 
information about business or litigation strategies (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 225 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003). 
 226 Id. at 1005-06. 
 227 Id. at 1007.  
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intended for the decision to deter the type of careless data-related practices 
that create risks of stalking and identity theft.228 
Similarly, in Wolfe v. MBNA America Bank,229 a federal court in Ten-
nessee held that a bank has a duty “to implement reasonable and cost-
effective verification methods that can prevent criminals, in some instances, 
from obtaining a credit card with a stolen identity.”230 The decision was 
rooted in concerns about deterring unnecessary economic losses. As the 
court explained: 
With the alarming increase in identity theft in recent years, commercial banks and credit card 
issuers have become the first, and often last, line of defense in preventing the devastating 
damage that identity theft inflicts. Because the injury resulting from the negligent issuance of 
a credit card is foreseeable and preventable, the Court finds that under Tennessee negligence 
law, Defendant has a duty to verify the authenticity and accuracy of a credit account applica-
tion before issuing a credit card.
231
 
1. Precautions and Activity Levels 
Subjecting potential defendants to liability for the losses that their en-
terprises cause not only influences what steps those persons take to ensure 
that an activity does not cause harm, but also the selection of activities in 
which those persons choose to engage. That is, the risk of liability influ-
ences both the choice of precautions and activity levels. For example, “[a] 
data handler could . . . prospectively limit its exposure to litigation not only 
by handling data carefully, but also by limiting the number of people about 
whom it collects data.”232 
In some instances, the implementation of precautions is sufficient to 
reasonably minimize the chances that certain losses will occur. However, if 
the exercise of care cannot effectively manage risks, the threat of liability 
may cause an actor to decide that the activity is not worth undertaking. 
Risky technologies or practices may be eschewed in favor of other modes 
of doing business.  
  
 228 See id. at 1008 (“The threats posed by stalking and identity theft lead us to conclude that the 
risk of criminal misconduct is sufficiently foreseeable so that an investigator has a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in disclosing a third person‟s personal information to a client.”). 
 229 485 F. Supp. 2d 874 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). After the defendant bank issued a credit card bearing 
the plaintiff‟s name to an unauthorized person at an address where the plaintiff never lived, the card-
holder then ran up charges that exceeded the card‟s limit and failed to pay. Id. at 878-79. After demand-
ing payment from the plaintiff and being informed that he was the victim of identity theft, the bank 
notified a credit-reporting agency that plaintiff‟s account was delinquent. Id. at 879. That caused a 
potential employer to reject the plaintiff for a job because of his poor credit score. Id.  
 230 Id. at 882. 
 231 Id.  
 232 Graves, supra note 5, ¶ 37, at 27. 
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For example, a business subject to liability for the loss of compute-
rized information might guard against that risk by encrypting the informa-
tion of data subjects. If encryption is too inconvenient or expensive, the 
company might eliminate practices that pose a particular risk of harm, such 
as by prohibiting employees from taking laptops with unencrypted informa-
tion away from the business premises. Similarly, the risk of liability may 
convince a business not to make computerized personal information access-
ible to company employees via the web because the risk of hacking is just 
too great. Alternatively, a company may decide that it should purge, rather 
than retain, outdated files containing personal information.233  
2. Internalization of Costs  
In some instances, the law can promote deterrence by compelling po-
tential defendants to internalize the costs of their endeavors. In other words, 
the courts use liability to reconcile burdens with benefits.234 Under this ap-
proach, persons cannot keep the profits of an endeavor while simultaneous-
ly avoiding responsibility for resulting losses. A person who enjoys the 
benefits must also bear the costs. This is why courts will hold employers 
liable for the torts of employees occurring within the scope of employ-
ment;235 possessors of animals liable for bites and other attacks;236 and con-
tractors liable for damages resulting from the use of dynamite in excava-
tion.237 
However, as presently configured, American law often allows data 
possessors to escape responsibility for the losses resulting from their negli-
gent data practices.238 Yet, data possessors frequently reap the benefits of 
  
 233 Cf. Editorial, supra note 29 (recommending federal adoption of a data security policy imposing 
“maximum periods for retaining personal data”). 
 234 See, e.g., Jones v. Manhart, 585 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that strict lia-
bility applies to dog owners, regardless of whether the owner has knowledge of “the vicious propensities 
of the animal”); JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 7-8 (explaining that the idea that “[t]hose who 
benefit from dangerous activities should bear resulting losses” has played an important role in the shap-
ing of modern tort law (emphasis omitted)).  
 235 See, e.g., Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 485-87 (1853) (applying 
the principle of respondeat superior to a railroad company); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 
(2006) (discussing respondeat superior). 
 236 See, e.g., Manhart, 585 P.2d at 1252; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 22-23 (2010) (discussing liability for harm caused by wild and domestic ani-
mals). 
 237 See, e.g., Starkel v. Edward Balf Co., 114 A.2d 199, 201 (Conn. 1955) (“The explosion of 
dynamite is an intrinsically dangerous means. Hence, one who explodes dynamite acts at his peril.” 
(citation omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 
& cmt. e (2010) (discussing liability for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities). 
 238 Similar conclusions have been reached by a Canadian author. See Chandler, supra note 55, at 
272 (“There is evidence that existing regulatory and market sanctions are insufficient to deter careless 
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assembling, preserving, and using digital personal information.239 Imposing 
liability for credit-monitoring damages will help to ensure that data posses-
sors will internalize the costs that are incidental to their practices. To that 
extent, they are more likely to engage in honest calculations of whether 
those practices are worthwhile and carried on in a way that reasonably mi-
nimizes the risk of losses associated with breaches of cybersecurity.240 
With respect to liability for medical-monitoring damages, the Third 
Circuit explained: 
Medical monitoring claims acknowledge that, in a toxic age, significant harm can be done to 
an individual by a tortfeasor, notwithstanding latent manifestation of that harm. . . . Allowing 
plaintiffs to recover the cost of this care deters irresponsible discharge of toxic chemicals by 
defendants and encourages plaintiffs to detect and treat their injuries as soon as possible. 
These are conventional goals of the tort system as it has long existed . . . .
241
 
The same analysis applies to recovery of credit-monitoring damages in 
a digital age where delayed detection of identity theft arising from breaches 
in cybersecurity can cause significant harm. Imposing liability for the costs 
of credit monitoring will deter negligent data practices and facilitate prompt 
detection of the opening of unauthorized accounts. 
In Texas, state records showed that prior to a massive breach of data 
security, “information technology departments shrank by 20 percent, saw 
high employee turnover and faced heavy productivity demands—
sometimes at the expense of security.”242 Ultimately, a public outcry forced 
the responsible state agency to offer free credit monitoring to millions of 
persons.243 Courts should consider whether a reduced investment in data 
security is “penny wise and pound foolish.” 
  
behaviour in many cases.”). Some sources focusing on the United States offer high estimates of costs 
arising from breaches of data security. See Edward Murray, Breaches, POST MAG., Jan. 13, 2011, at 18, 
18. According to the Ponemon Institute in Michigan:  
[E]ach compromised customer record costs companies a little over $200 . . . and includes 
outlays for detection, escalation, notification and response along with legal, investigative and 
administrative expenses, customer defections, opportunity loss and reputation manage-
ment. . . . [and] costs associated with customer support such as information hotlines and cre-
dit monitoring subscriptions. 
Id.; see also PONEMON INST., 2009 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH 4-5 (2010), available at 
http://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/fckjail/generalcontent/18/file/US_Ponemon_CODB_09_012209_
sec.pdf. 
 239 See Brian Azcona, Transaction-Generated Data, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVACY 562, 564 
(William G. Staples ed., 2007). 
 240 See Chandler, supra note 55, at 273 (“The recognition of potential liability in negligence might 
assist by forcing careless custodians of personal information to internalize the very real costs of their 
carelessness . . . .”).  
 241 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 242 Kelley Shannon, Combs Staff Swamped Before Data Breach, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 14, 
2011, at 1A. 
 243 Hart, supra note 92 (discussing the offer and surrounding circumstances). 
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B. Efficient Allocation of Losses 
Efficient allocation of costs often can minimize the economic burdens 
associated with injury-producing products and practices, such as the losses 
associated with defective consumer goods.244 One approach is to the shift 
the loss to the “cheapest cost avoider”245 and, thereby, reduce the magnitude 
of the loss. Another, often complementary, approach is to distribute the loss 
among a broad class of persons, such as all those who benefit from the in-
jury-producing product or practice, so that no one suffers the full weight of 
the loss and many persons each bear a minor share thereof.246 
The concepts of loss-shifting247 and loss-spreading248 are sometimes 
controversial. Nevertheless, they have played an important role in the shap-
ing of modern American tort law.249 They could be equally significant re-
  
 244 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 134, 163-65 (1970) (discussing methods of allocating accident costs to reduce the total im-
pact of accidents and injuries). 
 245 The concept of cheapest cost avoider (sometimes framed in the rubric of “least cost avoider”) is 
an established feature of law-and-economics scholarship. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & CHRISTOPHER 
R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 319 (2d ed. 2006). Judicial opinions occasionally 
discuss this topic. Thus, in a case dealing with liability for allegedly negligent marketing and distribu-
tion of handguns, a federal court in New York found that as “[a]s between a negligent handgun manu-
facturer and an injured bystander, the former must be regarded as the „cheapest cost avoider.‟” Hamilton 
v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated sub. nom. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 264 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 2001). The cheapest cost avoider principle has been influential in the shap-
ing of modern American tort doctrine. For example, it has been said that “[t]he product liability action 
for breach of warranty is an action in strict liability, not based on fault, allocating a risk of loss for 
policy reasons to the cheapest cost avoider.” Schneider Nat‟l, Inc. v. Holland Hitch Co., 843 P.2d 561, 
580, 587 (Wyo. 1992). However, it was probably an overstatement for the Fifth Circuit to write that 
“[m]odern negligence principles are to a large extent designed to place liability on the party who is the 
cheapest cost avoider or cheapest insurer.” Rankin v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 762 F.2d 444, 448 n.4 
(5th Cir. 1985). Many factors have shaped modern American tort law, including, among others, fault, 
proportionality, deterrence, efficient loss allocation, administrative convenience, predictability, and 
respect for the actions of co-equal branches of government. See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 7-
10 (discussing the policy foundations of tort law). However, in some tort cases, courts have held that the 
cheapest cost avoider principle is decisive. For example, the Ninth Circuit held in a public nuisance 
action “that the defendants are under a duty to commercial fisherman [sic] to conduct their drilling and 
production in a reasonably prudent manner so as to avoid the negligent diminution of aquatic life” 
because the defendants were “unmistakably . . . the best cost-avoider.” Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 
F.2d 558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974) (extensively discussing the economic theories of Guido Calabresi). 
 246 See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 138, at 8 (discussing loss-spreading and the idea that those 
who benefit from activities should bear any losses that result). 
 247 See id. (discussing the idea that “[t]he costs of accidents should be shifted to those best able to 
bear them” and how this can minimize the economic burden of accidents (emphasis omitted)).  
 248 See id. (discussing the idea that “[t]he costs of accidents should be spread broadly” and noting 
that “[l]osses can be spread not only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through 
other devices such as taxation and insurance” (first emphasis omitted)).  
 249 Id.  
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garding allocation of credit-monitoring costs that plaintiffs incur due to 
data-security breaches. By taking advantage of the economies of scale, it is 
reasonable to conclude that large data possessors, such as banks, universi-
ties, and national retailers can purchase credit-monitoring coverage for data 
subjects cheaper than those persons could purchase coverage for them-
selves.250 Moreover, in many instances, the costs of credit monitoring can be 
spread to some or all of the persons who benefit from a data possessor‟s 
activities. This may reduce the magnitude of the burden that must be car-
ried. 
For example, if a data possessor has 100,000 customers, and informa-
tion relating to one hundred of those customers is subject to unauthorized 
access, the costs of monitoring the credit of the one hundred affected data 
subjects can be spread among all of the data possessor‟s customers. The 
burden will not fall exclusively on those who happened to be among the 
unlucky one hundred. Thus, if the use of computerized information makes a 
business more effective or efficient, the costs related to such productivity 
will be spread among those who potentially benefit from that efficiency. 
CONCLUSION  
In recent years, expenditures on credit monitoring have become com-
mon. Today, it is often the case that potential cybersecurity defendants vo-
luntarily provide such services to affected data subjects;251 that courts ap-
prove settlements where compensation for credit monitoring is a large part 
of class-action recoveries;252 and, that judicial and administrative sanctions 
order provision of credit monitoring or reimbursement for expenditures on 
such services.253 These developments, all of which are relatively new, cloak 
expenditures on credit monitoring with the indicia of legitimacy254 and pro-
vide compelling grounds for courts to consider, afresh, the issues relating to 
whether a negligent data possessor can be held liable for the costs of credit 
monitoring. 
  
 250 See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998, 2009 
WL 5184352, at *8, *11 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009) (calculating the cost of two years of credit monitor-
ing provided in-kind at $37); Comparison of Credit Monitoring Services, supra note 18 (showing that 
the cost of credit monitoring, when purchased by an individual, can range from $8.95 to $29.95 per 
month); see also Learn Strategies for Managing Cyber Risk, supra note 95, at 16 (stating that annual 
costs for credit monitoring offered by a data possessor in cases of security breach “can range from $20 
to $100 per person”). 
 251 See supra Part II.B. 
 252 See supra Part II.C. 
 253 See supra Part II.D. 
 254 See supra Part II.E. 
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Expenditures on credit monitoring are a reasonable and necessary re-
sponse to any serious breach of data security,255 and therefore, compensa-
tion for such amounts should normally be available. A persuasive analogy 
can be drawn between credit monitoring and the awards for medical moni-
toring that many states permit in cases of toxic exposure involving threats 
to personal health.256 However, even in the absence of such precedent, ordi-
nary tort principles provide justification for credit-monitoring awards as 
reasonably necessary expenditures intended to mitigate damages. 
The so-called economic loss rule should not bar recovery of credit-
monitoring damages because the data protection obligations imposed under 
state data-security laws are not a proper subject for bargaining between data 
possessors and data subjects.257 Any agreements purporting to diminish the 
data-protection obligations imposed by relevant statutes258 are likely to be 
void as against public policy. Likewise, the fact that identity theft may have 
not yet occurred is no reason for courts to deny the recovery of credit-
monitoring expenditures.259 Such an award is intended to compensate af-
fected data subjects not for an increased risk of future harm,260 but for the 
reasonable and necessary costs of minimizing the risks of identity theft 
through protective detection of the opening of unauthorized new accounts 
in the victim‟s name.261 If negligence has factually and proximately caused 
a serious breach of cybersecurity, plaintiffs should recover those costs re-
gardless of whether identity theft ever takes place. 
Holding data possessors responsible for credit-monitoring costs will 
further the deterrence interests of the law by forcing data possessors to im-
plement reasonable precautions and avoid unnecessarily risky practices.262 
Moreover, placing the cost of credit monitoring on data possessors will, at 
least in the case of businesses, often shift the costs of credit monitoring to 
the cheapest cost avoider and, typically, spread the costs of data use to a 
broad class of persons will who benefit from the businesses‟ activities.263  
Consequently, in a wide range of circumstances, recovery of credit-
monitoring damages is appropriate. Compensation for such expenditures is 
consistent with sound community practices, basic legal principles, and the 
important public policies relating to deterrence and efficient loss allocation. 
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